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Access control is fundamental and prerequisite to govern and safeguard information assets
within an organisation. Organisations generally use Web enabled remote access coupled
with applications access distributed across various networks. These networks face var-
ious challenges including increase operational burden and monitoring issues due to the
dynamic and complex nature of security policies for access control. The increasingly
dynamic nature of collaborations means that in one context a user should have access
to sensitive information, whilst not being allowed access in other contexts. The current
access control models are static and lack Dynamic Segregation of Duties (SoD), Task
instance level of Segregation, and decision making in real time. This thesis addresses
these limitations describes tools to support access management in borderless network
environments with dynamic SoD capability and real time access control decision making
and policy enforcement. This thesis makes three contributions: i) Dening an Autho-
rising Workow Task Role Based Access Control (AW-TRBAC) using existing task and
workow concepts. This new workow integrates dynamic SoD, whilst considering task
instance restriction to ensure overall access governance and accountability. It enhances
existing access control models such as Role Based Access Control (RBAC) by dynami-
cally granting users access rights and providing access governance. ii) Extension of the
OASIS standard of XACML policy language to support dynamic access control require-
ments and enforce access control rules for real time decision making. This mitigates risks
relating to access control, such as escalation of privilege in broken access control, and
insucient logging and monitoring. iii) The AW-TRBAC model is implemented by ex-
tending the open source XACML (Balana) policy engine to demonstrate its applicability
to a real industrial use case from a nancial institution. The results show that AW-
TRBAC is scalable, can process relatively large numbers of complex requests, and meets
the requirements of real time access control decision making, governance and mitigating
broken access control risk.
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TA - Task Authority
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TASK - The concept of a task is a fundamental unit of business work or business activity.
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TP - Task Permission
URI - Uniform Resource Identi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VM - Virtual Machine
WORKFLOW - This is an IT term describing a business process. In general, it means a
product or method for supporting business processes in the enterprise environment
WAYF - Where are you from
XACML - eXtensible Access Control Markup Language




1.1 Identity and Access Management (IAM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Aim & Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Knowledge Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Presentation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 6
2.1 What is Identity Management? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Types of Identity Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Federated Identity Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Popular Identity Management Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)-based IMS . . . . . 10
2.3.2 OAuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.3 OpenID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Cloud Based Identity Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1 Identity Management-as-a-Service (IDMaaS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.2 Smart Applications on Virtual Infrastructure (SAVI) . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Identity Provisioning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5.1 Heterogeneous Resources-oriented Unied Identity Provisioning Model
(HR-OUIPM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5.1.1 Intercloud Architecture Framework (ICAF) . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Identity and Access Management (IAM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.7 IAM Functional Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7.1 Data Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.7.2 Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.7.3 Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.7.4 Identity and Access Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.8 Existing Access Control Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.8.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.8.2 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.8.3 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) . . . . . . 28
2.8.4 Risk Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.8.5 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.8.6 Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
vii
viii CONTENTS
2.8.7 Policy Based Access Control (PBAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.8.8 Workow Access Control Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.9 Access Control Adversaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.10 Limitation of Existing Access Control Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.11 An Industrial Use Case and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.11.1 An Investment Bank Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.11.2 System Context and Existing Business Process . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.11.3 Current Access Control Model and Workow . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.11.4 Current Access Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.11.5 How are Access Request Handled Currently? . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.11.5.1 Current Access Authorisation Workow . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.11.5.2 How is Access Administration Actioned? . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.12 Access Control Limitation Within the Industrial Case Study . . . . . . . . 38
2.13 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 METHODOLOGY 42
3.1 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.1 Inclusion Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.2 Study Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.3 Data Collection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Research Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.1 Phase 1 Initial Use Case - Identifying the Challenges . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2 Phase 2 Review of Literature - Identifying the Research Gaps and
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.3 Phase 3 Proposed Solution - The development of the Dynamic
Access Control Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.4 Phase 4 Evaluation Usefulness of the Proposed Model . . . . . . . 48
3.3.5 Phase 5 Research Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.6 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 AUTHORISING WORKFLOW-TASK ROLE BASED ACCESS CON-
TROL (AW-TRBAC) 51
4.1 Motivation for Dynamic Access Control Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1.1 Requirements for Dynamic Access Control Model . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2 Conceptual View of the Dynamic Access Control Model . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.1 Conceptual View of the Dynamic Access Control Model . . . . . . 53
4.2.1.1 AW-TRBAC Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3 AW-TRBAC Conceptual View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 Mathematical Model of Task Entailment Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4.1 Task Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4.2 Task Entailment Constraints Within the Workow . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4.3 Analysis of Use Case Requirement Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.5 Policy Specication Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.5.1 Access Control Policy Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.5.2 Extension of XACML Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
CONTENTS ix
4.5.3 Structure of XACML Policy Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.6 Comparison with Another Workow Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AW-TRBAC MODEL 70
5.1 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2 System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2.1 Access Portal API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2.1.1 Role Change URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2.2 First Manager Approval REST URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3 Dynamic Role Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3.1 Second Manager Approval REST URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3.2 Close Request REST URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.4 System Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4.1 Task Workow Support for XACML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4.2 Coupling of Policy Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4.3 Function Role Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.4.4 Static & Dynamic Segregation of Duties Check (SoD) . . . . . . . 78
5.4.5 Static & Dynamic Binding of Duties (BoD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.4.6 Single to Multiple Mapping (Role Change) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.7 Single to Multiple (Role Change Approver Check) . . . . . . . . . 80
5.5 AW-TRBAC Model Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.6 summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS 83
6.1 Requirements Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.1.1 Test Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.1.2 Invoking a SOD Security Request Through REST API . . . . . . 84
6.1.3 Policy for SoD Assertion in AW-TRBAC Engine . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.1.4 SoD policy to Match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.1.5 XACML Request Generated for a Request Invoked Through API . 85
6.1.6 Response for the Invoked Request Through REST API . . . . . . . 87
6.1.7 Binding of Duties (BoD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.2 Requirement Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.3 Applicability of the AW-TRBAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.3.1 Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7 CONCLUSIONS 94
7.1 Contributions of this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.1.1 First Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.1.2 Second Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.1.3 Third Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.2 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A Appendix 98
A.1 Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.1.1 Introduction and Justication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
x CONTENTS
A.1.2 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.1.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.1.4 Choosing the process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.1.5 Key Stakeholder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.1.6 Workshop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Bibliography 117
List of Figures
2.1 Comparison between network-based and claim-based identity management
system architecture, signies through solid lines (Ptzmann and Borcea-
Ptzmann (2009)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Federation through shared identity across domains through circle of trust
(COT) (Maler and Reed (2008)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Open un-federated identity model where service providers are linked and
interact through run time identity provider protocols; this allows a user
to utilise any supported identity protocol (Alrodhan and Mitchell (2007)) 10
2.4 SAML protocol ow of request and sequence of responses returned by each
entities (IdP and SP) (Kankaala et al. (2015)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 OAUTH protocol ow describes the negotiation between the four roles;Client,
Resource Owner, Resource Server and Authorisation Server (Hammer-
Lahav (2010)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6 Identity provider is the cloud service to which user authenticates and
service provider consumes the service from the identity provider (Mpofu
and Van Staden (2014)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.7 IDMaaS is a user-centric identity management system to manage user
information and operations to CSP's through API provided by CSP (Liu
et al. (2015)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.8 Smart Applications on Virtual Infrastructure(SAVI)architecture with cen-
tralised identity manager providing Authentication through middleware
on the identity provider and authorisation on the resource side (Faraji
et al. (2014)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.9 HR-OUIPM provisioning model concept of unied identity through map-
ping resource identities to unied identity information (which contains all
attributes of that resource) using three mechanisms: a Request Parser,
SPML engine and an Adapter (Liu et al. (2013)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.10 Internal enterprise framework incorporated business requirements and pol-
icy for identity management infrastructure (White et al. (2007)) . . . . . . 21
2.11 IAA Identity access management framework using SABSA methodology
to map business processes at business owner level to highlight potential
impact on business (Damon and Coetzee (2013)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.12 Comparison of idm on strategy & vision with respect to vision and depth
of solution scored out of 10 scale (Kumar and Rodrigues (2010)) . . . . . 23
2.13 Comparison on Idm's features and capabilities factors scored out of 10
scale (Kumar and Rodrigues (2010)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.14 Number of articles in information security domain identied through sys-
tematic literature review of identity and access management . . . . . . . . 26
xi
xii LIST OF FIGURES
2.15 Discretionary Access Control Model, based on the discretion of the em-
ployee functions (Lu and Jiang (2006)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.16 Mandatory Access Control Model, based on access to objects on the sen-
sitivity of the resources (Tassey et al. (2002)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.17 Role based access control (rbac) role architecture, showing roles connected
to resources and subject to prevent unauthorised disclosure of resource
(Sandhu et al. (2000)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.18 Policy based workow management model, based on polices on business
processes depicting needs for active access control (Ma et al. (2011)) . . . 32
2.19 Current Identity and Access Management life cycle from the inception of
a security request, management approval through to action of the request
by security administrator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.20 Existing access control models and it's limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1 Summary of Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Data Analysis approach through systematic review method . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Research conducted in six Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1 AW-TRBAC Dynamic Access Control Models shaded in green represent
the notion of task to support workow active access control for dynamic
access control behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2 Static structure diagram which describes the structure of the AW-TRBAC
system by showing the system's classes, their attributes, operations (or
methods), and the relationships among objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3 XACML Architecture and its interactions with various components PEP,
PDP, PIP and PAP for a request evaluation OWASP (2017) . . . . . . . . 64
4.4 Showing Extended XACML Standard, shaded in blue components devel-
oped to meet AW-TRBAC dynamic access control behaviours . . . . . . . 65
4.5 A sequence of events of task execution and authorisation are required to
be executed in an orderly manner and a just in time decision need to
be made based on the evaluation of various components of XACML in
AW-TRBAC access control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6 Comparison of AW-TRBAC with other authorisation models based on
gaps identied in the development of the access control model . . . . . . . 68
5.1 Shows the AW-TRBAC architecture, which extends the ve core com-
ponents of the XACML architecture to support Instance restriction for
enforcement of use case logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2 A Rest HTTP Request/Response for a role change . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.3 Implementation of the function in AW-TRBAC engine as part of the ex-
tended XACML Standard to support dynamic access control requirement
for SoD and BoD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.4 Implementation of the function in AW-TRBAC engine as part of the ex-
tended XACML Standard to support dynamic access control requirement
for role change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.5 AW-TRBAC portal Dynamic Access Control Model Integration, demon-
strates the interactions between the system components and the service
to allow authorised access to resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.1 Invoking a SOD Security Request Through REST API . . . . . . . . . . . 84
LIST OF FIGURES xiii
6.2 SoD policy request handled by the AW-TRBAC engine . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.3 Policy for SoD assertion in AW-TRBAC Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.4 XACML Request Generated for a Request Invoked Through API . . . . . 87
6.5 Response for the Invoked Request Through REST API . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.6 Audit Logs of the Tests Based on Requirement Satisfaction Experiment . 89
6.7 Security Request Executed via API Client Call to AW-TRBAC Engine . . 90
6.8 Security Request Result for the API client to AW-TRBAC Engine Perfor-
mance Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.9 Comparison of System Performance Against Complex Role Change Request 91
6.10 Summary of Results for SoD and Role Change Request . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A.1 Sequence diagram showing new user request workow . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A.2 Sequence diagram showing role transfer request workow . . . . . . . . . . 116
A.3 Sequence diagram showing role termination request workow . . . . . . . 116
List of Tables
4.1 Set Theory Label . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 REST - Role Change Initial Request, the URI for the Role Change Request
within the AW-TRBAC portal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2 REST- Role Change Initial Response extracted and used by the AW-
TRBAC engine to validate the request from the value of UserId, RoleId,
TaskId and ResourceId . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.3 REST - Role Change First Approval Request the URI for the Role Change
Request within the AW-TRBAC portal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4 REST - Role Change First Approval Response is executed after successful
role change initial request, AW-TRBAC engine validate the request from
the value of UserId, RoleId, TaskId and ResourceId . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.5 REST - Role Change Second Approval Request, the URI for the Role
Change Request within the AW-TRBAC portal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.6 REST - Role Change Second Approval Response is executed after suc-
cessful role change rst approval, AW-TRBAC engine validate the request
from the value of UserId, RoleId, TaskId and ResourceId . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.7 REST - Role Change Close Request, the URI for the Role Change close
out Request within the AW-TRBAC portal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.8 REST - Role Change Close Request after successful validation of second
approver update on the system data store and responses with HTTP 200 . 77
xiv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Almighty for his blessing bestowed upon me in pursuit of
ProfDoc.
I would like to dedicate this ProfDoc to my Children aged 11 and 9 Xavier and Zayaan,
they were solicitous to cultivate their mummy's ProfDoc, sacrice and compromise made
to full the ProfDoc goals.
A massive thank you to my Supervisors Dr Ameer Al-Nemrat and Dr Shareeful Islam
for their help and guidance throughout the course of ProfDoc, their determination to
succeed, patience and perseverance through dicult times were the prominent drivers
behind reaching my ProfDoc goals.
Nothing in this world is achieved without support of a good family, I am blessed with
a pre-eminent mother, through her encouragement and support it has been possible to
full the goals in life.
I would like to thank my husband Arman for his support, inspiration and dedication
toward my achievements in ProfDoc.
Lastly, I would like to thank my brother for his continuous support and reassurance to
see light at the end of the tunnel. I would also like to thank my sister for her support in
high and low times through the journey of the ProfDoc.
xv
PUBLICATIONS
 Uddin, M., Islam, S. and Al-Nemrat, A., 2019. A Dynamic Access Control Model
Using Authorising Workow and Task-Role-Based Access Control. IEEE Access,
7, pp.166676-166689.
 Uddin, M. and Preston, D., 2015. Systematic review of identity access management
in information security. Journal of Advances in Computer Networks, 3(2), pp.150-
156.
 Uddin, M., Al-Nemrat, A., 2014. Is the Security Bubble within Investment Banking
Sector about to Burst, Proceedings of the International Conference on Information
security and Cyber forensics, Kuala Terengganu, Malaysia.
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the problem this thesis will address, details of the
use case (Investment Bank), and describes the contribution of this thesis to the state of
the art of knowledge.
1.1 Identity and Access Management (IAM)
Identity and access management (IAM) is a framework for business processes that facili-
tates the management of legitimate user identity and access control of business sensitive
assets. The term access control refers to an organisation's policy for authorising access,
the mechanisms and processes by which the policy is enforced, and the model on which
the policy and processes are based. Access control technology has evolved from research
and development eorts supported by the Department of Defence (DoD) (Tassey et al.
(2002)). There are two fundamental types of access control: Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). While initial research and applications
addressed preventing unauthorised access to classied information, recent applications
have applied these access control policies to commercial environments such as Banking,
Healthcare and Retail (O'Connor and Loomis (2010)). Other research has considered
the approaches to the access control model that are restricted based on the organisation
role, that are dened access entitlements at a granular level (decentralised granular level
of entitlements) such as Role Based Access Control (RBAC) (Rajpoot et al. (2015)), At-
tribute Based Access Control (ABAC) (Biswas et al. (2016)), eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) (Rissanen et al. (2013)), and Risk Adaptive Access Control
(RAdAC) (Farroha and Farroha (2012)).
Organisations are now dynamically changing the access privileges of users or revoking
existing privileges due to various business demands. There are many applications that are
running from outsourced environments such as the cloud or from supply chain partners,
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which need to deal with access control dynamically compared to the traditional in-house
application, as network accessed through various endpoint devices such as mobile devices,
iPad, bring your own devices (BYOD) and dispersed geographical locations. According
to Daniel Crowley, (Martin (2019)) head of research for IBM's X-Force Red today,
network access must be dynamic and uid, supporting identity and application-based
use cases, a sophisticated access control policy can be adapted dynamically to respond
to evolving risk factors. Ted Wagner Chief Information Security Ocer (CISO) at SAP
national Security Service emphasised In every data breach, access controls are among
the rst policies investigated, access controls are a key component. When not properly
implemented or maintained, the result can be catastrophic.
Due to the borderless network (the technical architecture that allows organizations to
connect anyone, anywhere, anytime, and on any device, securely, reliably, and seamlessly.
It is the foundation for the network infrastructure, providing optimization, scale, and
security to collaboration and visualisation), there has been a mixed approach to access
management across sectors. Web-based remote access, coupled with application access
distributed on various networks and hosted on the cloud, means that enterprises are
faced with various challenges including administrative issues, data privacy, increased
operation burden, monitoring issues, and regulatory compliance. For the organisation
to sustain a competitive edge, internal and external users are accessing systems from all
over the world and from a variety of devices. This means that the identities of these
users and their associated access, rather than the network, are forming the new security
boundary around the organization, this change in thinking highlights the importance
of getting Identity and Access Management (IAM) right, both to facilitate the business
and to stay ahead of audit, compliance and regulatory requirements. According to data
breach report 2019 (Rafter (2019)) 3800 publicly disclosed breaches, 4.1 billion number
of records exposed, and breaches have increased 54% in comparison to 2018. Amongst
the breaches there has been a nancial breach of Capital One (Rafter (2019)), which
resulted in largest category of information accessed and cost the organisation between
$100-$150 million, the hacking which was as a result of miscongured security system
access control.
Despite signicant developments, existing access control models do not focus on granting
access, enforcing dynamic Segregation of Duties (SoD) (Ma et al. (2011)), where a role
have conicts of interest, such as an approver and submitter, in other cases where ap-
prover becomes the submitter and through his role as an approver allowing approval of
his own request, this require restriction at the task level to enable SoD dynamically and
Binding of Duties (BoD), requires similar restriction at the role and task level however
restriction is at the role and task being performed by the same user and access gover-
nance through workow management (Crampton (2004)), where event log of sequence
of tasks performed ensuring visibility of access to data.
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1.2 Research Problem
Overly complex security policies of access control in dynamic environments lead to data
breaches. According to (Verizon (2019)) Data Breach Investigations Report, 75% of
breaches were tied to credential theft and ineective identity and access management.
Responses to the Executive Perspectives on Top Risks for 2019 from 825 board members
and executives of various industries (including Finance) (Beaumier (2019)), indicate
that privacy and identity, and access management, are in the seventh position for top 10
risks in 2019. This is supported by Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
based on data submission from 40+ rms that are specialised in application security
and industry survey that was completed by 500 individuals (OWASP (2017)). This data
spans vulnerabilities gathered from hundreds of organizations and over 100,000 real-world
applications and APIs. Ten most critical Web application security risks selected and
prioritized according to this prevalence data, in combination with consensus estimates
of exploitability, detectability, and impact, which indicates that broken access control
relating to escalation of privilege is in fth and insucient monitoring and logging is in
ninth position, of the top 10 application risks.
This thesis focuses on an access control model for a global investment bank based in
London (due to privacy, name will not be mentioned). It has assets over 1 trillion dollars
and oces in 17 locations worldwide. It is a privately held nancial institution and has
been a thought leader and a solution provider for over 200 years. Expert in Corporate
Banking, Merger & Acquisition advisory, Investment Management, and wealth manage-
ment and investor services. Among the many challenges are balancing complex and
ever-changing regulatory and compliance requirements with eorts to boost eectiveness
and reduce costs through digital transformation such as cloud deployment, Robotics,
Articial intelligence and blockchain (Beaumier (2019)).
This thesis will develop a dynamic access control model for the industrial use case, with
the capability to support a dynamic environment, whilst mitigating the risks associated
with accessibility though a diverse range of devices.
1.3 Aim & Objectives
Aims:
The aim of the research is to develop a dynamic access control model to enable authorised
access and prevent unauthorised access to information assets.
Objectives:
1. Analyse the access management model of an investment bank to identify access
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control requirements and limitations.
2. Use systematic review methodology to identify gaps in the access control model
literature.
3. Construct a conceptual access control model using the use case requirements.
4. Proof of Concept (PoC) implementation of the dynamic access control model by
extending the open source XACML (Balana) engine.
5. Validation of the case study requirements against the PoC to test for requirement
satisfaction and applicability against the case study
1.4 Knowledge Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are:
First: The proposed AuthorisingWorkow Task Role-based Access Control (AW-TRBAC)
model. This approach builds on existing task and workow concepts to develop a new
identity and access management solution. This work uses dynamic segregation of duties
and process workow and considers the task instance restrictions for the role's resource
restriction, access governance and logs (Audit compliance and forensic analytic). There-
fore, this research enhances the existing access control models such as RBAC and ABAC
by dynamically granting users access rights, to promote access governance and risk mit-
igation.
Second: This work extends the Oasis standard of XACML for developing a dynamic
access control policy language so that it can enforce the access control rules and adds
functionalities to enforce Segregation of Duties (SoD) at the task instance level, mitigat-
ing the risk of broken access control. (OWASP (2017)). Through the logging of instance
task events, it enhances access governance to provide visibility of unmanaged data , such
as data that are sensitive in nature, access granted to need to know basis and in unstruc-
tured form (unstructured data is information that either does not have a predened data
model or is not organized in a pre-dened manner: excel, pdf, Google drive).
Third: The AW-TRBAC model is implemented using the open source Balana policy
engine (Chen et al. (2013)) to demonstrate its applicability to a use case of a nancial
institution. The test results show that AW-TRBAC model has minimal impact on overall
system performance despite changing user access requests dynamically and mitigating
the risk of escalation of privilege to prevent data disclosure.
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 5
1.5 Presentation Overview
Chapter One: Is an introduction to the area of research, research problem, aims and
objectives and contributions to the knowledge.
Chapter Two: Is a literature review taking a broad view of identity management
systems and identity and access management paradigms, which then narrows down to
a detailed analysis of access control models and its limitations. Next, access control
adversaries (threats) are discussed along with the top 10 risks associated with access
control model, its limitations and their consequences. Finally, the industrial use case
access control model is investigated for its limitations and gaps in sustainability within
the emerging technology such as robots and Articial Intelligence (AI).
Chapter Three: Describes the methodology used to conduct the research in this thesis,
including discussion of design, tools, approaches, limitations and advantages.
Chapter Four: Depicts a proposed Authorising Workow and Task Role-based Access
Control model (AW-TRBAC) that enhances the existing access control model through
application of RBAC and ABAC access control model concepts. It is designed to provide
and enhance additional features and functionalities for sustainability and resilience in a
dynamic environment. It also extends the Oasis standard of XACML to meet the policy
enforcement requirements of the case study.
Chapter Five: Details the design and implementation, AW-TRBAC model, system
architecture, implementation design and integration, Application Programming Interface
(API's) and mapping between technologies to support the integration of AW-TRBAC
model, and task based policy enforcement for information security.
Chapter Six: Details the experiments that have been set up to meet the objectives of
the research. Results were recorded and discussed in the context of the requirements of,
and applicability to, the industrial case study that this research is based on.
Chapter Seven: Concludes the thesis and suggests future work.
Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of existing identity systems and widely adopted
identity management systems, identity models, provisioning systems, frameworks to learn
what is known within the knowledge. It then narrows down to access control models
and works that focused on identity and access control management, to unveil what
is unknown. Several industrial experts survey and opinions have been studied along
with the security breach reports related to the adversaries within access control. An
approach which is common in medical research eld, where volume of clinical data is in
huge quantity and analysis required to narrow down to specic area. Similar approach
which have been used to analyse gaps in the published research in this thesis, through
a systematic literature survey of Identity and Access Management (IAM), as identity
management is well researched area which has attracted wide range of academia and
industrial attention for its importance in information security.
Finally, this chapter analyse the use case of an Investment Bank, its current access control
model and limitations to identify the requirements to incorporate and compare against
the literature review to identify the gaps in the research.
2.1 What is Identity Management?
Identity management consists of the processes and all underlying technologies for the
creation, management, and usage of digital identities. A typical identity management
system consists of: users (the end user or an agent acting on the user's behalf), identity
providers (responsible for validating a user's authentication credentials and assert for
the in a single sign-on) and service provider (an entity that is responsible for validating
a user's authentication credentials and assert for the in a single sign-on). The user
requests resource access from the service provider, which relies on the identity provider
to authenticate information about the user. These three components alone cannot be
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held accountable, therefore a legal entity (an organisation or individual person), that is
responsible and accountable for the activities performed on a system is required. The
identity of this entity is the set of all service providers, characteristics that have been
attributed to this entity (Joosten et al. (2008)).
2.2 Types of Identity Management Systems
There are many types of identity management systems (IMS) that exist, see Fig 2.1,
broadly divided into network-based identity management and claim-based identity man-
agement, diering in architecture, which has an impact on the security, privacy and
usability issues associated with them (Ptzmann and Borcea-Ptzmann (2009)).
Figure 2.1: Comparison between network-based and claim-based identity management
system architecture, signies through solid lines (Ptzmann and Borcea-Ptzmann (2009))
The mechanisms behind Network-based Identity Management System is as follows: when
a user requires access to a service, they are authenticated by the identity provider (IdP)
and upon successful authentication, the user is given a token, that will then be forwarded
to the service provider (SP), as shown in Fig 2.1. The service provider then veries the
token, and if valid, accepts the user as authenticated. To obtain further identifying
information about the user, the service provider then contacts the identity provider
directly, using the token as a pointer to the user prole stored by the identity provider.
In some cases, the user arbitrates this exchange of information between the identity
provider and service provider. Examples of network-based identity management systems
are OpenID2 (Karim and Adnan (2019)), the Liberty Alliance3 (Fuchs et al. (2011)), and
Shibboleth in (Cantor and Scavo (2005)). As there are wealth of identity information
stored at the IdP, which makes the IdP a single point of failure and vulnerable to security
theft, if a user successful in obtaining credential details to login to IdP.
Claim-based Identity Management System is where the service provider mandates the
information it requires to grant access to the resources. The user is required to obtain
a claim (attributes about the identity) after authenticating with an identity provider,
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attributes in this instance such as assertions by Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML 2.0) (Kankaala et al. (2015)), as shown in Fig 2.1, which is then forwarded to
the service provider and the user is authorised to access the resources. A SAML assertion
is a declaration about a user by an identity provider to a service provider.
The crucial dierence between network-based and claim-based identity management sys-
tems is that, in the claim-based setup, there is no direct exchange of information between
the identity provider and the service provider , giving the user more control over the ex-
change of authentication information. Even though there are exist policy tools such
as uApprove5 (Alpar et al. (2011)) for network based IMS systems that allow a user
to deny or give consent to releasing his attributes to the service provider, the actual at-
tribute assertion exchange still takes place with the service provider and identity provider
communicating with each other directly as shown by dotted line labelled 4 in the Fig
2.1. Examples of claim-based identity management systems are the Identity Metasys-
tem (Windows CardSpace) (Ahn (2019)), and more privacy friendly concepts like Idemix
(Camenisch et al. (2019)) and U-Prove (Paquin (2013)). In the latter two cases, claims
are in fact anonymous, and are not transferred to the RP directly. Instead, the statement
of the claim is proven to the RP in a zero-knowledge fashion. This ensures the user's pri-
vacy, because it retains the user's condentiality in the two interactions with the service
provider, removes the need for application to perform authentication task. The majority
of identity management systems are network-based; however, claim-based approaches is
a new concept which enhance privacy and have better security and usability as the user
is in control.
2.2.1 Federated Identity Management
The concept of federated identity management (FIM) (Maler and Reed (2008)) is some-
times a cause for confusion. At times the term is used to describe the collaboration of
several RPs to use a single IdP, all within the same domain. Such a setup is the standard
form of identity management, where no real federation takes place. Instead, federated
identity management is actually a setup where identity is shared across domains in Fig
2.2. Within such a federation, additional agreements can be made for further optimi-
sation, e.g. to have a centralised authentication authority. The so-called circle of trust
(CoT) equals the set of domains that belong to one federation; domains can also belong
to several federations and therefore can belong to several circles of trust, as shown in Fig
2.2.
The identity provider issues relevant credentials to the users. To access a resource, the
user would be authenticated by the identity provider, which will then redirect the user
to the service provider to access the resource. Once a user is authenticated at the federal
level, the user can then have authorised access to resources within the federated services;
such mechanisms are employed by Single Sign-On (SSO) services. The Google service is
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Figure 2.2: Federation through shared identity across domains through circle of trust
(COT) (Maler and Reed (2008))
an example of a model consisting of one authenticator and many services such as Gmail,
Google Drive, Calendar, Google Scholar, etc. Google acts as a gateway to allows a user to
access all resources within Google services through a single sign-on mechanism whereby
a user authenticates once, and this is federated through all Google services.
Although federated identity management solutions are widely employed in corporate and
academic environments, many problems still arise. These systems can provide convenient
user functions (such as single sign-on or automated form-lling), however, the single layer
of authentication decreases system security, while it increases the value of user credentials
(as it provides access to more resources). As the number of identity providers and service
providers increases, FIM systems become dicult to manage and maintain.
Another model which has gained popularity in resolving this issue through employment
of social networks is called the Open Un-federated Identity (OUI) model (Alrodhan and
Mitchell (2007)). This model diers from federated models as the user is not restricted
to a single identity provider, service providers are linked and interact through run time
identity provider protocols; this allows a user to utilise any supported identity protocol.
This model is used in many popular social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and
LinkedIn which store a number of dierent user attributes and the user can authenticate
themselves through their social network prole to access other services online. OpenID
(Domenech et al. (2014)) and OAuth (Hardt (2012)) are the two most popular identity
protocols for this model. Figure 2.3 illustrates the idea of an entity in the OUI Model.
The solid line signies that this model is not part of a federation thus this model is not
reliant on any factor such as being part of CoT, however this model is not suitable where
minimum trust is necessary between entities.
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,
Figure 2.3: Open un-federated identity model where service providers are linked and inter-
act through run time identity provider protocols; this allows a user to utilise any supported
identity protocol (Alrodhan and Mitchell (2007))
2.3 Popular Identity Management Models
Several popular identity management systems have been widely used for identity and
access management. In this section, three of the most popular, SAML-based systems
(Kankaala et al. (2015)), OpenID (Recordon and Reed (2006)) and OAuth (Hardt
(2012)), are discussed.
2.3.1 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)-based IMS
SAML identity management system utilises the federated identity model (Jøsang et al.
(2005)) and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (Kankaala et al. (2015)).
SAML is an XML (eXtensible Markup Language)-based standard for exchanging au-
thenticated and authorised information between dierent applications (Kankaala et al.
(2015)). It is based on the request/response protocol in which a service provider requests
identity information about a user from an identity provider, which responds to the request
with appropriate user attributes for authentication as shown in Fig 2.4. SAML consists
of four key concepts: assertions, bindings, proles and protocols. SAML assertions con-
sist of statements: Authentication statements, Attribute statements and Authorisation
decision statements. As SAML is widely used for SSO, commonly within web services,
this allows ease of use, centralised credential management, and better governance and
controls for authorised resources. There are a number of dierent libraries for building
up a SAML-based identity management system such as Shibboleth (Cantor and Scavo
(2005)) and SimpleSAMLphp (UNINETT) (Ferdous and Poet (2013)) developed using
Java and PHP respectively.
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Federation of service providers and identity providers using SAML is achieved using a
Trust of Anchor List(TAL). This entails exchanging respective metadata of the identity
provider and service provider and storing them appropriately. This ensures mutual trust
between the two parties; it provides assurance to the service provider that the identity
provider will authenticate the user using reliable security mechanisms and provides at-
tributes to the service provider based on contractual agreement (Jøsang et al. (2005)).
On other hand, trust is required from the service provider that condentiality and in-
tegrity of the attributes disclosed will be retained and used for the intended purpose
only.
Figure 2.4: SAML protocol ow of request and sequence of responses returned by each
entities (IdP and SP) (Kankaala et al. (2015))
2.3.2 OAuth
OAuth is an authentication protocol which allows one application to interact with another
application on behalf of a user without sharing credentials. This approach circumvents
some of the limitations related to access delegation in a traditional method. As an
example, let's consider the case of Joe and Mat; Joe would like Mat to post something
on his Twitter stream. In the traditional method, Joe would have to share his username
and password with Mat as a way of delegating responsibility. This would result in full
compromise of the system without any control aorded to Joe, and revocation of such
access rights is cumbersome.
OAuth 1.0 was superseded by OAuth 2.0 (Hardt (2012)), which provides a exible solu-
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tion to this problem, allowing any user to delegate their access right in a more manage-
able and secure way. The OAuth protocol comprises of four dierent classes of entities:
User,Consumer,Authorisation Servers and Service Provider.
User. Someone who owns and controls the protected resources and are capable of granting
(delegating) limited access rights to (consumer) third parties for accessing protected
resources.
Consumer (Client). This is a third-party application that can make requests to access
protected resources on behalf of a user. To make such a request, they must receive an
authorisation clearance from the user.
Authorisation Servers. Authorisation servers are responsible for granting access tokens
to consumers after receiving valid authorisation grants.
Service Provider. Resource servers host protected resources and can accept and respond
to requests for access using access tokens. In many cases, resource and authorisation
servers may be the same entity as the service provider. A number of legs is used to
describe the number of entities involved in an OAuth interaction.
As shown below in Fig 2.5 describes the negotiation between the three/four roles and
includes the following steps:
1. The Consumer/client requests authorization from the resource owner.
2. The User redirects the request to Service provider (authorisation server)
3. The Consumer requests an authorisation token from the service provider
4. The authorization server validates the Consumer credentials and if valid issues an
access token
5. The Consumer requests the protected resource from the resource server and au-
thenticates by presenting the token
6. The resource server validates the access token, and if valid, grant the request
(Noureddine and Bashroush (2011)) Introduce an optimization to OAuth 2.0, where the
Authorization Server is provisioned with explicit authorization table to make decision at
the Authorization Server prior request reaching the protected resource. This reduces the
amount of processing time and alleviates the risk of potential threats such as Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. Limitation of this model is
not suited for multi-tenancy environment which require shared Authorisation Server to
secure token for each tenant in a secure way.
Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 13
Figure 2.5: OAUTH protocol ow describes the negotiation between the four roles;Client,
Resource Owner, Resource Server and Authorisation Server (Hammer-Lahav (2010))
2.3.3 OpenID
OpenID is a decentralised identity management system, based on an open unfederated
identity model. It is a widely used identity management system, used by web service
providers such as the BBC, Google, PayPal, Verisign and Yahoo (Domenech et al. (2014)).
OpenID protocols are used as SSO and have three components: user, service provider
and OpenID provider. A user would create an account with the OpenID provider, au-
thenticate via the OpenID service provider to receive a token, that would then authorise
the user to access resources within the service provider.
2.4 Cloud Based Identity Management
Cloud is built on existing technologies and tools, reducing the cost of service delivery
whilst increasing the speed and agility of service deployment (Voas and Zhang (2009),
(JoSEP et al. (2010)). The core technology behind cloud computing is virtualisation
(Keith and Ole (2006)), (Uhlig et al. (2005)), which empowers the whole cloud computing
paradigm. The virtualisation technology allows the separation of physical hardware and
the operating system by creating an abstract layer between them. This allows a greater
degree of extensibility by enabling sharing of physical resources virtually, by more than
one OS. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Rittinghouse and
Ransome (2017)) dene cloud computing as the composition of ve essential character-
istics: three service models and four deployment models. There are currently three well
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dened service models: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS)
and Software as a Service (SaaS).
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) provides virtual server instances and storage on de-
mand, service provider is responsible for physical and virtualization and the customer
company is responsible for the operating system, application and data. Root accounts
are all managed by the provider which creates risk for the customer (Tassey et al. (2002)).
In the Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) setup, software and product development tools are
hosted, allowing developers to create an application on the provisioning platform. The
provider is responsible for the security of the platform, but securing the application and
data is the customer's responsibility. In the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) setup, customer
organisations access data through a portal, and the overall security responsibility falls
to the provider organisation. As you move down the stack from SaaS to IaaS overall re-
sponsibility falls more on the customer organisation and less on the provider. Although
with the SaaS service, overall responsibilities fall to the provider, the total risk is not di-
minished. This is the reason organisations need to exercise control over privileges either
directly or via an enforceable obligation on the part of the provider.
According to the latest update to the International Data Corporation (IDC) (Murray
(2019)), Worldwide Semi-annual Public Cloud Services Spending Guide. With a ve-
year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 22.3%, public cloud spending will grow
from $229 billion in 2019 to nearly $500 billion in 2023. Cybersecurity Ventures predicts
global spending on IAM products and services will exceed $16 billion USD annually by
2022 (Menlo Park (2017)). According to the Gartner Inc IAM spending forecast (Gartner
(2019)), world-wide spending on information security products and services reached $114
billion in 2018, an increase of 12.4 percent from previous year and market is forecast to
grow 8.7 percent to $124 billion in 2019.
A review of various cloud-based IAM (Identity Access Management) systems using var-
ious evaluation criteria concluded that cloud IAM needs improvement in terms of its
features and functionalities (Habiba et al. (2013)). Although they address authentica-
tion, authorisation and access rights delegation, none of the currently existing cloud IAM
systems full the complete requirements auto-provisioning deprovisioning, SSO and en-
titlement reporting) for identity and access management. According to Kandukuri, ve
cloud security issues should be addressed in a Service Level Agreement for an organ-
isation (SLA). They are: privileged user access, data location, data segregation, data
disposal, and investigation and protective monitoring (Kandukuri et al. (2009)). Privi-
leged user access ensures only authorized users have access to an organisation's data and
resources. Therefore, identity and access management are considered security concerns
in cloud computing. Various models have been proposed to address identity management
in clouds, such as central IAM, trusted third party, federation solutions, etc. Most of
the solutions are mainly focused on federation of cloud providers and pay little or no
attention to access management.
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A list of available technologies and solutions for cloud computing has been compiled
(Fuchs et al. (2011)), including Primary and Identity Management for Europe (PRIME),
Windows CardSpace, OpenID, Higgins, and Liberty Alliance. Current approaches to
cloud IAM concentrate on oering solutions to issues such as federation or ner-grained
access control. The lack of a comprehensive analysis, from conception to physical im-
plementation, to incorporate these solutions, has resulted in impractical and fractured
solutions. Simple Cloud Identity Management (SCIM) provides a dened standard Ap-
plication Programming Interface (API) and user schemas which have been adopted by
vendors of cloud providers (Lewis (2012)). Unrealistic optimism in information security
by the IT managers needs to be resolved (Rhee et al. (2012)).
2.4.1 Identity Management-as-a-Service (IDMaaS)
IdMaaS is a cloud service as shown in Fig 2.6, where a third party assumes the identity
management role on behalf of the identity owner (which is an organisation) leaving
the organisation to devote almost their entire eort to the core business (Mpofu and
Van Staden (2014)). A typical IdMaaS environment at an abstract level consists of
the identity provider (also acts as the identity manger in the cloud), identity owner
(individuals, organisations or any other entity whose identity information is to be used
for authentication purposes) and the relying party (website or online services which
consumes identity provider services to obtain security credentials for users). Identity
provider is the cloud service to which user authenticates and service provider consumes
the service from the identity provider.
1. Identity (ID) owner submits identity attributes for account creation or login de-
tails if they are existing users to the ID provider. The ID providers will do the
authentication and transmits a package of authentication and authorisation details
for the relying party.
2. The relying party will respond directly to the users with the relevant services.
Subsequent requests will now be directed to the relying party once a user has been
authenticated.
3. In case of account creation, the ID provider will create the account guided by the
agreements they entered with the relying party
IDMaaS is a user-centric identity management system as shown in Fig 2.7. It provides
a central node to storing users' proles, les and friend lists (such as Alice and Bob
register their details). It is not necessary any more for users to login in dierent Cloud
Service Provider (CSP) to manage data. Users can login to IDMaaS to manage their
data and update information or other operations, as shown in Fig 2.7 to CSPs through
APIs provided by CSPs. User tokens used to connect to CSPs are stored in IDMaaS (Liu
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Figure 2.6: Identity provider is the cloud service to which user authenticates and service
provider consumes the service from the identity provider (Mpofu and Van Staden (2014))
et al. (2015)). IDMaaS contain three roles, User, IDM Service and CSP. Six modules are
included in the IDM service. Three of them (myProle, myFriend, and myFile) are data-
related and other three modules (myAuth, myCloud and myAccess) implement identity
authentication and access control management. Additionally, unied APIs are provided
by the IDM Service for multiple CSPs, aimed at unied identity and data management.
Figure 2.7: IDMaaS is a user-centric identity management system to manage user infor-
mation and operations to CSP's through API provided by CSP (Liu et al. (2015))
An advantage of this model is a centralised identity provider (IdP), which supports
universal communication protocols for multiple service providers' environments. It also
contains FPE (format Preserving Encryption) which ensures (FPE) is a useful encryption
method which encrypts a plaintext without altering its length or format, and hence the
encrypted message can be updated into original data entries of databases or les without
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replacing the corresponding plaintext. The disadvantage of this model is that it is a new
concept and it doesn't detail the mechanism by which the API will connect to the CSP.
2.4.2 Smart Applications on Virtual Infrastructure (SAVI)
Feraji (Faraji et al. (2014)) as shown in Fig 2.8, proposed another centralised IAM
model which is based on the Smart Applications on Virtual Infrastructure (SAVI). It
consists of a centralised identity provider with decentralised middleware to connect to
the resource provider. The SAVI IAM is a central identity manager with distributed mid-
dleware based on an IdP/SP model and is comprised of 6 basic components: Manifesting
Management, Identity Management, Policy Management, Token Management, Authen-
tication Management, and Middleware. Middleware resides on the identity provider side
and provides the authentication, and the middleware resides on the resources sides and
provides authorisation.
Figure 2.8: Smart Applications on Virtual Infrastructure(SAVI)architecture with cen-
tralised identity manager providing Authentication through middleware on the identity
provider and authorisation on the resource side (Faraji et al. (2014))
The advantage of this model is, results of the testbed and evaluation indicates that that
is it scalable and adaptable. The disadvantage of this model is that it doesn't support
multiple service providers and mobile devices.
2.5 Identity Provisioning System
Identity provisioning is a software service used by enterprises to integrate and manage
the process of providing users access to enterprise systems and business data. It is
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interrelated with security services, such as creating a user's account, resetting passwords,
and synchronising all certications among application systems. As a recently emerging
technology, identity provisioning simplied the process of software installation and policy
conguration. Thereby, identity provisioning has been of widespread concern in the
industry (Sakimura et al. (2015)).
2.5.1 Heterogeneous Resources-oriented Unied Identity Provisioning
Model (HR-OUIPM)
In order to solve the issue of identity provisioning for heterogeneous resources, identity
would need to be assigned to resources directly. Integration of the provisioning process
is constrained by dierences in identity information formatting between resources. HR-
OUIPM (Liu et al. (2013)) put forward the concept of unied identity through mapping
resource identities to unied identities, so that users can use a single unied identity to
complete provisioning operations. This resolves the issue of heterogeneous identities in
the model. The HR-OUIPM model in Fig 2.9 is based on SPML and XML (Liu et al.
(2013)). The identity provisioning request contains unied identity information and
identity mapping will convert the information from the unied identity to the specic
resource identity (which contains all attributes of that resource) using three mechanisms:
a Request Parser, SPML engine and an Adapter.
A Request Parser transforms unied identity provisioning to standard XML docu-
ments according to request types and resources identities, based on SPML. Standard
XML documents are encapsulated by SOAP and send to an SPML parser. The SPML
parser tests the legality of the received request according to the XML schema of SPML.
If the result is positive, the parser will divide and analyse this request message based
on SPML semantics. After parsing, the system will store the information in a persistent
directory service. All heterogeneous resources can obtain identity information by con-
necting to the directory service SPML Engine, the main use of which is to parse SPML
requests, transforming them to API invocations. This model uses XML parsing using
SAX-based SPML OXMap-ping, as it is memory saving and it also oers random access
ability.
The adapter is responsible for integrating these heterogeneous resources. LDAP (Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol)is used to store resource identity information so that all kinds
of resources could connect to LDAP to obtain identity information. The adapter is im-
plemented based on NSS and PAM. In Windows OS, GinaDLL, developed by Microsoft,
is used to replace the default MsGina, so that information in LDAP can be obtained from
Windows OS instead of local SAM. The data access interface is published as a web service
for applications to obtain identity in-formation. For Apache servers, mod_auth_ldap in
NSS is used to implement the adapter.
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Figure 2.9: HR-OUIPM provisioning model concept of unied identity through mapping
resource identities to unied identity information (which contains all attributes of that
resource) using three mechanisms: a Request Parser, SPML engine and an Adapter (Liu
et al. (2013))
Existing identity provisioning model are mostly user-oriented , service provider-oriented
and Network-oriented (Stein et al. (2007)). These models did not consider resources, so
they lack the ability to integrate heterogeneous resources eciently.
In user-oriented identity provisioning models, the user is the centre of the system, such
that every kind of information is under the user's control. This can be implemented
in several ways, such as SAML (Cantor et al. (2005)), a UAC module in Windows OS,
or a SUDO module in Linux OS. User-oriented identity provisioning models can make
users obtain and update trust values more eciently and can protect user's privacy to
a certain degree. Shortcomings of these models are that security policy conguration is
complicated, and it is dicult to manage identity information.
Service Provider-oriented identity provisioning models mainly concern service providers.
These kinds of models maintain mechanisms to select security services dynamically, in-
cluding authentication, authorisation and access control. Kerberos (Abdul and Wilson
(2019)) is an authentication protocol that implements this kind of model and support
multi-domain authentication through trust, however scalability can be a problem as the
no of domain increase and for hybrid cloud environment where dierent authentication
protocols are used . SP-oriented models are usually inexpensive and easy to deploy. Be-
cause the service provider completely controls identity management, identity information
is managed safely and eciently. However, this kind of model is not convenient for users
to utilise.
Network-oriented identity provisioning models mainly concern conguration and man-
agement of networks, and related security and access control issues. The advantage of
these kinds of models is to reduce cost and fully reuse hereditary resources. They also
have the ability to control inter-operation between systems and ensures security trans-
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formation on the transport layer. However, this kind of model does not take the user
experience or the service provider into account. HR-OUIPM implements identity provi-
sioning of heterogeneous resources, oers an access interface for unied identity, which
is the basis of identity management and single sign-on.
Khamadja (Khamadja et al. (2013)) proposed another access control as a service model
for highly exible and dynamic environments such as cloud computing, called CatBAC
(Category-based Access Control). This is used for building dedicated access control
models starting from a generic meta-model of access control, with two stages of rene-
ment. In the rst stage, the meta-model is rened into an abstract model according to
the high-level policy of the organisation; this stage is completed by the cloud provider.
The second stage allows for the generation of several concrete models from the abstract
model by network administrators at the various sites of the organisation, respecting the
local constraints and specicities of each site. The method illustrated in this paper gives
cloud providers an access control, security solution that can be a cloud service for both
providers and users. It allows users to dene their own low-level policies in such a way
that these policies can be rened correctly from the abstract policy dened by their cloud
provider.
A review of literature indicates there are no generally agreed frameworks for identity
access management within enterprises because cloud IAM (even hybrid IAM) is still a
maturing market, there is work that needs to be done for it to continue to gain ac-
ceptance by organizations large and small. The rst and most important are related
to standardization, in process, methods, and tools. This means standards in protocols
and authentication methods that need to be supported across IAM providers. Industry
standards will emerge, as will IAM frameworks (Waters (2016)). Another identity pro-
visioning model was proposed by Koch (Koch and Worndl (2001)), which concentrates
on storage of user information, privacy and cryptographic means of authentication and
concentrates less on access control, provisioning, data management or governance.
According to Windley (Windley (2005)), a coherent set of standards, policies, certi-
cations and management activities aimed at providing a context for implementing an
identity infrastructure that meets current goals and objectives of the business. Later,
White (White et al. (2007)) proposed a framework combining identity administration of
entities with their identity-based access management, to control access to the resources
of an enterprise in Fig 2.10. This framework brings business requirements and policy into
a logical structure which then becomes part of the identity management infrastructure,
however this is a theoretical model and would require further research to determine that
it is suitable for implementation for dierent enterprises and federation.
Damon (Damon and Coetzee (2013)) proposed Identity and Access Assurance (IAA)
model using White's model as seen in Fig 2.11. This framework incorporates nine levels
of requirement for IAA using SABSA methodology. This model provides insights into
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Figure 2.10: Internal enterprise framework incorporated business requirements and policy
for identity management infrastructure (White et al. (2007))
the IAA components and business processes at a business owner level, removing technical
complexity and providing an explanation of potential impacts on the business. The re-
search references a single framework and architecture and have not mapped or associated
their models into the identity and role access management domain.
2.5.1.1 Intercloud Architecture Framework (ICAF)
Demchenko (Demchenko et al. (2014)), has described a research eort at the University
of Amsterdam to develop the intercloud Architecture Framework (ICAF), to address the
problems of multi-domain heterogeneous cloud-based application integration and inter-
provider and inter-platform interoperability. This paper denes the basic scenarios in
federated cloud service provisioning and access control that include both a user side
federation model and a provider side federation model. The paper denes the main roles
and actors in the cloud federations, to address many practical problems in smooth multi-
provider service integration and delivery to enterprise or campus users, using (national
research and education network) NREN and campus-based identity management services
as a trusted third party which is expected to facilitate creation of dynamic federations
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Figure 2.11: IAA Identity access management framework using SABSA methodology to
map business processes at business owner level to highlight potential impact on business
(Damon and Coetzee (2013))
between multiple cloud service providers and customer organisations. Further research
will include modelling of the proposed intercloud federation models to evaluate eective
methods for identity provisioning and access control policy evaluation in a heterogeneous
intercloud environment.
2.6 Identity and Access Management (IAM)
IAM refers to digital identity in a corporate environment and needs to be treated with
high priority. Irrespective of the dierent applications and platforms used by dierent or-
ganisations, resources need to be managed and allotted to the appropriate identity/user
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(i.e. provisioning management) with proper access rights (access/policy management).
This process is called identity and access management (Kumar and Rodrigues (2010)).
Kumar and Rodrigues have used previous survey carried out by the Forrester Research
and Burton Group, an independent worldwide technology and market research group to
evaluate ve top IDM vendors, namely IBM, Novell, SUN, Oracle and CA based on;
Strategy and Vision (Identity management vision and breadth of solution) in Fig 2.12,
and six features and capabilities of identity management (IDM); policy and role manage-
ment, data management, access management, setup and integration, administration and
self-service and customer reference, in Fig 2.13. The authors concluded that even after
years of healthy adoption rates, the IDM market is just beginning its path to broad adop-
tion and deeper penetration. A strong identity and access management (IAM) strategy
is an important element of any programme to prepare organisations to comply with new
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Recently (Kunz et al. (2014)) carried out
another survey on IAM trend predicted by analyst within Capgemini, Ernst & Young,
Gartner, Forrester and KuppingerCole (including nance) against published literature,
the results suggest that shifts in IAM is towards managing risk and risk reduction and
risk is the top strategic priority for industries to prevent security incidents and data
breaches.
Figure 2.12: Comparison of idm on strategy & vision with respect to vision and depth of
solution scored out of 10 scale (Kumar and Rodrigues (2010))
2.7 IAM Functional Taxonomy
Identity and access management encompasses three functional areas: Data Security,
Provisioning and Compliance.
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Figure 2.13: Comparison on Idm's features and capabilities factors scored out of 10 scale
(Kumar and Rodrigues (2010))
2.7.1 Data Security
A systematic review on identity access management (Uddin and Preston (2015)) re-
vealed results in Fig 2.14, it showed the intensity of research carried out in the dierent
functional taxonomy of identity access management. Between 2010-2013, 33% of all the
articles selected contained research on data security such as: Data in transit or still,
data storage, data model and privileged accounts access data, According to (Caldwell
(2013)) data in transit or still will need to be protected to avoid data breaches. As
shown in Fig 2.14, cloud security has been grouped with data security, as this is a form
of mobile data storage, and research on this topic comprised about 14% of all articles.
There were total of 47% articles containing research on data security. Although there
is a high level of research interest in data security, it remains under-researched, as the
technology is evolving and new research areas are emerging, such as mobile data, BYOD
storage data, cloud data; there is no concrete solution for data security. According to the
2019 data breach report from Verizon Business, 10% breaches were Financial Industry,
38% of breaches were caused by insiders, 15% breaches were misused by authorised users
and 71% breaches were nancially motivated, and 29% beaches were involved stolen
credentials.
2.7.2 Provisioning
Provisioning refers to granting, managing access to an identity with supporting conden-
tiality, integrity and availability. From the systematic review in Fig 2.14, IAM solutions
have been considered as part of provisioning, as the security domains are interrelated
and dicult to separate into individual domains. IAM Standard and IAM solutions have
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been grouped into the provisioning domain, and 6% of all research articles in information
security have information related to IAM solutions. The IAM solution provides auto-
provisioning tools to reduce operational cost and reduce the risk of security breaches by
eliminating redundant accounts and segregation of duties and 6% of the included articles
contained research on IAM standards, that's a total of 12% of research articles contain-
ing research on Provisioning. According to Brandessence Market Research via COMTEX
(MarketWatch (2019)), Identity and access management (IAM) Market based on; Global
Size, Trends, Competitive, Historical & Forecast Analysis for 2019-2025, growth in oc-
currences of cyberattacks has considerably augmented the adoption of consumer IAM
solutions among organizations. Global Identity and access management (IAM) Market
is valued at USD 10.41 Billion in 2018 and expected to reach USD 24.52 Billion by 2025
with the (Compound Annual growth rate) CAGR of 13.02% over the forecast period.
2.7.3 Compliance
The compliance is the third functional taxonomy of IAM and has been divided into the
subgroups of policy, security awareness, and workow, as shown in Fig 2.14. The articles
that have been reviewed contain information on policy (14%), compliance (8%), workow
(6%), and assurance (3%). Combining all four subgroups provides 31% of all research
articles. It is also noted that in the year 2013, security awareness was the most heavily
researched topic. This could represent the emergence of a new research eld in response
to ongoing data breaches and loss of data, to understand the underlying causes. In a
2012 survey of 2,000 members of the UK public by Check Point and Yougov, over 50% of
oce workers said they regularly do not follow security best practice, and 23% weren't
aware of what their company's policy stated. Another survey carried out by PWC (PWC
(2015)) in 2015 indicates 72% of organisations where policy was poorly understood and
sta related breach. According to the 2019 data breach report from Verizon (Verizon
(2019)) Business, 10% breaches were Financial Industry, 38% of breaches were caused
by insiders. The identity and access management market are primarily driven by the
increased demand in security governance, enforcement and concerns due to distributed
systems, according to Varonis (Varonis (2019)), three billion Yahoo accounts were hacked
in one of the biggest breaches of all time. Whereas in same year Uber reported that
hackers stole over 57 million riders and driver's information.
2.7.4 Identity and Access Management Issues
The rst phase of IAM which was geared toward on-premise traditional infrastructure
within the organisation has been unsuccessful and is still under development and not
fully understood (Everett (2011)). Data owner is lacking knowledge to understand every
application and its sensitive nature, one of the pitfalls highlighted in Protiviti report
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Figure 2.14: Number of articles in information security domain identied through system-
atic literature review of identity and access management
Identity and access management in nancial service-staying ahead of the curve (Beau-
mier (2019)). It is the business that needs to understand the application system and
its processes before deploying a tool. It is important not to implement a tool to assist
with the workow process if that process is not working eciently. Every organisation
is implementing controls or patching up broken systems to satisfy compliance legislation
(Hart (2013)); there are little, or no involvement of senior stakeholders and the failure
of IAM was due to the implementation of an o the shelf IAM system. Change that are
been put in place within the organisations are a reactive approach and under the control
of higher management.
Due to the de-parameterised nature of the business operation, data are accessed via
mobile devices, users are using their own devices at home to connect to sensitive data,
and much IT infrastructure is based in SaaS or the cloud. According to (Dinoor (2010))
privilege is not just managing account privilege, it is also the multitude of contexts
in which users, accounts, data, applications and processes interoperate. Privilege is
generally understood in terms of controlling users who have high levels of authorisation
to access, and control over, corporate IT systems, information assets and applications.
Poor control over privilege accounts can be risky from a security perspective. Despite
overwhelming advantage of Cloud technology Security and privacy issue of user identities
is still a concern (Nida et al. (2014)).
Up until now, networking teams have been involved in security system scanning and
patching up infrastructure, and information security teams involved in provisioning user
entitlements, however, both teams need to work together to nd a better security solution
for IAM. As a corporate outsource to manage servicing, hosting and cloud providers,
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increasingly, have direct control over customer organisation data.
2.8 Existing Access Control Model
This section of the thesis analyse the existing access control models within the academic
knowlegebase and its limitation, to identify what is known within the literature to identify
gaps within the literature.
2.8.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
DAC permits the granting and revoking of access control privileges to be left to the
discretion of the individual users, mechanism allows users to grant or revoke access to
any of the objects under their control. As such, users are said to be the owners of the
objects under their control. However, for many organisations, the end users do not own
the information to which they are allowed access. Access priorities are controlled by
the organisation and are often based on employee functions rather than data ownership.
Disadvantages of the discretionary model are segregation of duties (SoD) violation (due
to fail-ing to link entitlements to a user business function (Lu and Jiang (2006)) as shown
in Fig 2.15, policy violation with user groups not knowing who a member of the group
is, inadvertently creating a breach whereby the object owner granting access using a pre-
exiting user group is unaware of how the access has been authenticated. Job rotation
leads to orphaned accounts which are inherited from the previous business function.
Figure 2.15: Discretionary Access Control Model, based on the discretion of the employee
functions (Lu and Jiang (2006))
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2.8.2 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
MAC, as dened in the DoD's Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC),
also known as the Orange book, is A means of restricting access to objects based on
the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects
and the formal authorization (i.e. Clearance) of subjects to access information of such
sensitivity (Tassey et al. (2002)). Although MAC is well-suited for military applications,
it is not well-suited to commercial and dependant organisations as shown in Fig 2.16,
due to diversied and complex organisation systems require a policy-independent access
control model.
Figure 2.16: Mandatory Access Control Model, based on access to objects on the sensi-
tivity of the resources (Tassey et al. (2002))
2.8.3 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
XACML is based upon XML and was developed to specify access control policies in a
machine-readable format (Rissanen et al. (2013)). Policy creation can be complicated
and the use of XACML does not necessarily make the task of creating, specifying, and
enforcing good access control policy any less dicult. There is also a need to ensure that
the entire enterprise uses the same attributes for access, and that all the attributes are
from an authoritative source. In simple terms, an Authoritative Attribute Source (AAS)
should be able to specify which sources of attributes are authoritative for the policy,
and there should be mechanisms to verify that the attributes provided by a requester
come from the AAS. In practice it can be very dicult to establish one authoritative
attribute source. This is especially true in situations in which dierent enterprises must
work together and must implement access control between themselves.
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2.8.4 Risk Adaptive Access Control (RAdAC)
Risk adaptive access control uses information from the environmental condition and
risk level, combining information about a subject machine, corporate IT infrastructure,
and environmental risk factors for the decision-making process (Farroha and Farroha
(2012)). An advantage of this approach is that if the policy allows then decisions can be
overridden where necessary, for example, in a high risk environment it will enforce dual
authentication, and in a low risk environment it will make a decision based on the digital
policy. A disadvantage of this approach is that like policy-based access control (PBAC)
it relies on digital policies, and if they are ambiguous, then it can result in a security
breach.
2.8.5 Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
Role based access control (RBAC) is a framework using roles to control access permis-
sions. Users are grouped into roles, each role may have several members and a set of
de-ned granular levels of credentials (Sandhu et al. (1996)). A user will only have access
to information which has been allowed according to their role, and this will prevent unau-
thorised access to information and possible security breaches. The RBAC model achieves
the two principles of security systems: segregation of duties and least privilege. Least
privilege is where a user is granted access to perform their day-to-day business function;
this prevents intentional or unintentional damage to the system and under-entitlement
or over-entitlement or combinations of inherited permission access rights. Segregation
of duties is where roles are mutually exclusive, for example a trader cannot both enter
and release their own trades. Roles can have separate permissions grouped into a high
privilege role.
NIST developed and published a comprehensive RBAC model in 1992, providing the rst
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) technical specications and formal description, fol-
lowed by an expanded model in 1995. NIST, with Ravi Sandhu, at the time with George
Mason University, proposed a standard for RBAC in 2000. This proposal was revised in
2001 and NIST drafted the nal standard proposal and led the ANSI/INCITS RBAC
standardization committee. ANSI/INCITS 359-2004 (Sandhu et al. (2000)) RBAC was
adopted in February 2004 as shown in Fig 2.17. The proposals and adopted standard
largely eliminated the uncertainty and confusion about RBAC's utilities and denition;
it has served as a foundation for software product development, evaluation, and procure-
ment specications.
30 Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Figure 2.17: Role based access control (rbac) role architecture, showing roles connected to
resources and subject to prevent unauthorised disclosure of resource (Sandhu et al. (2000))
2.8.6 Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC)
Attribute based access control (ABAC) has no consensus model to date (Tassey et al.
(2002)). The concept is that is user and resources have attributes known about them,
either through situational data, such time of the day or which people are logged on
to the network, or through user data such as title or location. The system can make
instantaneous decisions about whether the user is appropriately authorised to access the
object or to perform the function. The data elements analysed are known as attributes.
The advantages of this approach are greater exible than RBAC because it does not
require separate roles for relevant sets of subject attributes, and rules can be implemented
quickly to accommodate changing needs. Disadvantages are that access control policy
might become more dynamic than preferable for audit and attestation, as it requires
many rules which makes analysis dicult (Wang et al. (2004)). The user entitlement
access report is dicult to understand, and the access is based on attributes rather than
entitlements (Rajpoot et al. (2015)). ABAC (Hu and Kuhn, 2015) has been around for
over two decades and numerous models (Biswas and Sandhu,2016) have been proposed. .
Despite the existence of these dierent ABAC models, there is no consensus on a specic
standard ABAC model (O'Connor et.al, 2010).
2.8.7 Policy Based Access Control (PBAC)
Policy Based Access Control (PBAC) is an emerging model that seeks to help enterprises
address the need to implement concrete access controls based on abstract policy and
governance requirements. This approach is an extended approach to ABAC, it supports
specic governance objectives, it uses the attributes from resources, the environment
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and the requestor's information to permit or deny requests for access to resources (Wang
et al. (2004)). The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires application-level
logic, enter-prise-wide, but also requires a mechanism to have unambiguous policies to
prevent authorised access to resources.
2.8.8 Workow Access Control Model
A workow is an automation of business processes in whole or part, during which infor-
mation or task is passed between participating in activities or action (Brambilla et al.
(2011)). Ma (Ma et al. (2011)) proposed a policy-based workow management (PBWF)
model, which entails policies based on the business processes, including access control,
authorisation and authentication. Authors have used the notation of TBAC and RBAC
to depict the ow of information and show that both dynamic and static access control
is needed in a workow in Fig 2.18. However, there are various authorisation policies
within an organisation which have not been studied much. There are many systems
with many dierent access control models and resolving the conicts between dierent
authorisation policies to integrate into this is challenging. Bertino (Bertino et al. (1997))
proposed a SoD for workows, however it focused more on dening roles that are SOD
rules and constraints and did not consider task instance constraints. This model fo-
cused on SoD within workows, which requires prior knowledge of the specication and
its task, thereby limiting the on-time decision making. A similar model proposed by
Chadwick (Chadwick et al. (2007)), Multi-session SoD (MSoD), where the focus is SoD
both at the instance level, and permanently, utilises the business context concept, has
resolved the instance level restriction, however lacks decision-making intelligence, as it
requires predened business context and identication SoD policies. An active access
control mechanism does not provide task-based authorisation. WSession (Botha and
Elo (2001)) proposed a similar model which requires a pre-identication of all conict-
ing roles, users, tasks, and privileges and lacks support for active access control and
task-based authorisation.
Various other workow systems have been proposed based on the RBAC concept such as
Weber's (Weber et al. (2005)), where the focus is primarily on security and exibility in
workow systems emphasising dynamic aspects of sequence and adaptability at runtime.
Authorising Workow Role based Access Control (AWRBAC) is another workow model
based on extended RBAC and focuses on adaptive workow systems and lacks instance
level restrictions and task level constraints in proceedings (Leitner et al. (2011)). A
generic meta-model that can be used to extend workow languages to support access
control requirements in workow systems has been proposed (Strembeck and Mendling
(2011)). This meta-model is designed to be used in conjunction with workow languages
with on-time and run time constraints (including instance level restrictions). This model
has been designed to act as enforcement/decision making which would reside on top of an
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existing model, cannot be used on its own and thereby, another dynamic access control
model is required. It also does not have the capability to handle task authorisation
requests.
Figure 2.18: Policy based workow management model, based on polices on business
processes depicting needs for active access control (Ma et al. (2011))
2.9 Access Control Adversaries
A recent survey of 40+ security specialist industries by OWASP Inc discovered two crit-
ical access control risks, insucient logging and monitoring, and broken access control
in top 10 list of the risks (OWASP (2017)). The threat (adversaries) is designed us-
ing the threat model within application security is based on the established STRIDE
(Spoong, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation
of privilege) and DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Aected users, Dis-
coverability) exploitability models to determine the likelihood of adversary (threat) (Do
et al. (2018)). Typically, the goal of the adversary is to disrupt or prevent proper opera-
tion of a secure system. Exploitation of insucient logging and monitoring is the bedrock
of nearly every major incident. Improper or absent logging of events, such as failed lo-
gin transactional logs, allow attackers to further attack systems, maintain persistence,
pivot to more systems, and tamper with, extract, or destroy data. Broken access control
refers to restrictions on what authenticated users are allowed to do, which are often not
properly enforced; the risk associated with this is attackers can exploit these aws to
access unauthorized functionality and/or data, such as access other users' accounts, view
sensitive les, modify other users' data, change access rights, etc. Exploitability occurs
when the attacker changes a parameter value that directly refers to a system object for
which he is unauthorized through applications and APIs, where all the user privilege
requests are not veried resulting in improper privilege escalation. Another research
project on the risk adaptive access control (RAdAC) has suggested using information
from the environmental condition and risk level.
Recently, multiple dynamic attributes such as application usage and unlock failure is
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considered for ensuring access control and data condentiality of mobile cloud environ-
ment (Agrawal and Tapaswi (2019)). The model needs preinstallation in the hand set to
capture the attributes and addresses mobile authentication adversary. The results show
an ecient uninterrupted communication between the users and the cloud storage server.
Three factors authentication scheme is proposed by (Adavoudi-Jolfaei et al. (2019)) for
wireless sensor networks. Formal and informal security analysis is done of proposed pro-
tocol using known and unknown attacks such as stolen smart card attack and privileged
insider attack. The result shows that the approach is more secure and ecient than the
existing schemes.
2.10 Limitation of Existing Access Control Models
After careful consideration of the two widely used access control models, they are essential
and eective, however there are several limitations of these models in the context of
supporting current business processes. These limitations are discussed below.
RBAC supports a limited number of dierent types of authorisation constraints, which
cannot full the requirements that have emerged in modern organisation's business pro-
cesses (Ferraiolo et al. (2001)). A typical constraint, which is very relevant, well-known
and probably the most used in the security area is Segregation of Duty (SoD). Although
there are many variations, SoD is fundamentally a requirement that critical operations
are divided among two or more people so that no single individual can compromise
security.
RBAC is an essential concept in the workow access authorisation model. However,
segregation of duties applies to the role level. In a business process context, segregation
of duties can apply on the task instance. This is not supported by RBAC, sometime
restriction is on task to be performed by the same person which is referred to as BOD
(bind-ing of duties), and the person who issued the task should close the task. This is to
prevent fraud, misuse of privilege and error. In workow authorisation models, SOD and
BOD constraints are required for same instance, i.e. one cannot submit and approve
in the same instance, at the same time, the person who submitted the request needs
to close it in the case of emergency password release (security team needs to issue
the password and check-in the password). The current business workow model does
not accommodate instance level restriction (IR), or order of SOD (Knorr and Stormer
(2001)). In business processes, multiple role instances allowed for single user, to maintain
segregation in this context an instance level restriction needs to be enforced. This
implies that order-based separation of duty in role-based systems should be used in the
context of workows.
If a user terminated (revoked) what happened to their session, which had been activated
through their role, should the role be terminated instantly or retained for a period before
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terminating it (deleting it). This has not been specied in any authorisation model, nor
in the NIST standard (Thomas and Sandhu (1998)). Rules for revoking of user sessions
immediately as well as retaining the session active for a period while disabling the account
for audit purposes when requested are entirely missing from RBAC.
RBAC is policy neutral and can express DAC and MAC. However, role-based access
control has its own set of limitations such as role explosion and role-permission explosion
(Rajpoot et al. (2015)). It is also restrictive in nature since the accesses are based only
on roles and it is dicult to include other characteristics of users, and contextual or
environmental factors (e.g.time, location, etc.) in access control policies. User access en-
titlement report generation is dicult and authorised access is driven based on attributes
(context) of the subject rather than user credentials. Although ABAC research has re-
ceived signicant attention in academia, it is not so common to nd implementation of
these models in industry. There are a few existing tools such as XAMCL and Policy Ma-
chine (Ferraiolo et al. (2001)) that can express dierent types of Attribute-based Access
Control Policies. However, wide adoption of these tools remains a challenge.
Using tasks in tasks based access control it easier to deal with tasks rather than permis-
sion particularly since a bundle of permissions is often required to perform a unit of work
at an application level. Therefore, it is useful to use task-based allocation. Each task
has an associated set of related permissions, where each permission is a pair made up
of an action and a resource. For example, the task close role transfer, includes the set
of permissions (access, security Request Database), (read, request), (check, role prole
blueprint), and (edit, Access request database). The notion of workow tasks involved
in role transfer, departmental transfers. A request submitted by Security Coordinator
which needs to be approved by the role Revocation Manager, which is then required ap-
proval from the on boarding Department Manager. It is important that task sequences
are followed in order otherwise it will result in audit malfunction and a user having more
access than required. This workow task is not supported by the XACML-RBAC stan-
dard as RBAC is a passive policy model; the XACML standard needs to support both
task notation and complex role transfer validation through role change policy using an
additional function.
2.11 An Industrial Use Case and Limitations
The case scenario developed for this research has been chosen from a real life complex,
sensitive environment that uses workow processes across multiple systems. Processes
that run across multiple systems are a common feature of the modern business landscape
and they represent a challenge for workow security and access control.
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2.11.1 An Investment Bank Use Case
This research is based on an identity access management for a global investment bank
based in London. Due to the data privacy act and the condential information (GDPR),
the investment bank will be referred to only as Investment Bank X. It has assets of over
a trillion dollars and 17 locations worldwide. It is a privately held nancial institution
and has been a leader and a solution provider for over 200 years. Bank X is considered
an expert in corporate banking, merger & acquisition advice, investment management,
wealth management, and investor services.
2.11.2 System Context and Existing Business Process
In the access control workow process for the high security environment of an investment
bank, requests for access are submitted via a security request database, which will then
send a notication to the approving manager and the nal approval request will reach the
information security department to be actioned in Fig 2.19. The organisational security
policies and rules require least privilege and separation of duties (SOD) to minimise
fraud and error.
2.11.3 Current Access Control Model and Workow
The current access request workow runs as two separate workow systems for Internal
Client and Privilege Account Management (emergency password). There are three roles
involved: Security Coordinator (who submits the request), Manager (who approves
the request), and Security Administrator (who grant access to the resource). As can
be seen in Fig 2.19 the access request to the banking system should only be submitted
by the role Security Coordinator. Approval of that request will need to be approved
by the role manager. Access is granted after satisfying the condition that supporting
documents with management approval are provided to another role security administra-
tor. Once access has been provisioned and the security coordinator has been notied,
the role Security Administrator can close the access request. To enforce segregation of
duties (SoD), a Security Coordinator cannot be an approver.
In a more dynamic process where roles or departments are transferred, two levels of
approval are required: approval from the manager the user is transferring from, as well
as the manager the user is transferring to. It is essential to enforce that the rst ap-
prover approves the requests before the second approver, as sequence of tasks needs
to be maintained. The old credentials need to be revoked before granting new creden-
tials. Maintenance accounts are high privilege accounts which are required for emergency
patching and testing. Maintenance accounts are owned by the IT support teams who
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also can change the password, as part of the binding of duties (BoD). The security team
who check out the password should check-in the password.
In the case of role termination, user accounts need to be disabled and the permissions
need to be revoked. Accounts are retained for 30 days before deletion.
Figure 2.19: Current Identity and Access Management life cycle from the inception of a
security request, management approval through to action of the request by security admin-
istrator
2.11.4 Current Access Provisioning
Access provisioning is the process of managing user identities into identity stores, ini-
tialising their credentials and enabling them to access IT resources. Access control pro-
visioning consists of three processes: Access request, Access Authorisation and Access
Administration in Fig 2.19. Access request is submission of a request by a security co-
ordinator for a new joiner, leaver or transfers in the Bank requiring a list of required
access based on another person's prole in the department. Access Authoriser is the
high-level Manager who authorises the requests for new joiners, transfers and termina-
tions. Access Administrators are responsible for granting access to the WEB, LAN and
MAINFRAME applications for the new joiners and transfers, and revoking access from
terminated employees.
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2.11.5 How are Access Request Handled Currently?
Access request is a high-level policy which entails sequencing of tasks and approval from
high level managers. A standardised workow is very important in protecting informa-
tion, audit trails and enforcement of policies within organisations. A workow is a set of
tasks to perform business functions, and tasks that are part of workows require active
access control (Jiang and Lu (2006)).
 Workow: Mixture between role based access control process and traditional as
per model ID based access request; this creates confusion between the requester,
approver and administrators. Dierent workows need to be followed using dier-
ent systems. This results in ambiguous audit trails and ineective administration
by the system administrators.
 Emergency Password Workow: During system maintenance and emergency main-
tenance of infrastructures, high privilege access requests are assigned to the devel-
opers. This follows its own workow and approval; it is then subdivided into
emergency access request in absence of authoriser and in absence of authoriser for
scheduled maintenance. Audit trails and monitoring becomes an issue, and the
Administrators bear the burden of changing the passwords for these accounts.
2.11.5.1 Current Access Authorisation Workow
Access authorisation is a high-level policy set up by the organisation to enforce policies
to reduce the risk of fraud. It is vital that that chain of custody is maintained, and
granular level of access understood. Current issues within the authorisation workow
are:
1. High risk applications require additional approval to the main workow, however,
additional approval is primarily maintained via e-mail and not stored centrally for
future audit trails.
2. Additional le share approval along with the access request workow, additional
approvals are not followed in the work for access to sensitive information stores
(le share).
3. Comprehensive information when approving access requests, granular level details
are not available to approvers, and high level managers are unaware if sensitive
information will be disclosed to unauthorised parties.
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2.11.5.2 How is Access Administration Actioned?
It is said that access administration holds the key to the kingdom, as misuse of data
could lead to reputation damage, nancial loss, fraud and compensation. Eective ad-
ministration with robust technology coupled with security awareness is the key to secure
information. Current issues within organisation administrations are:
1. Automated provisioning - Semi Automated Identity management, access tools,
deployment resulted in ambiguous and ineective administration. API connectivity
with legacy systems has proven dicult
2. Role engineering explosion - Role engineering has been dicult and has resulted
in a role per user. Role policies dened in the automated tool only function at the
business process level as opposed to business function level and the application level.
Adequate centralised role storage systems have not been possible to implement.
3. The cumbersome administration, is becoming cumbersome and ineective, numer-
ous access, workow to follow and numerous instances of manual administration,
which are prone to error.
2.12 Access Control Limitation Within the Industrial Case
Study
The access control workow process for the high security environment of Bank X would
be submitted via a coordinator into a security request database, which will then send
a notication to the approving manager for approval. The request will reach the In-
formation Security Department to be actioned in Fig 2.19. A challenges is the three
dierent authorisation systems operating independently, lacking in governance and user
access reconciliation. The organisational security policies and rules of least privilege
and separation of duties to minimise fraud and error become onerous, and role level
restriction requires restriction within the task level, which is referred to as instance level
restriction. Role change requires management approval in a sequence where manager
in the current role is required to approve the change request rst then the onboarding
role manager is required to approve the request. It is necessary to ensure previous role
credentials are revoked prior to granting new credentials. Current challenges and gaps
within the identity and access management are as follows;
 There is a lack of dynamic access control to accommodate the diverse hosting of
information. This could also impose the escalation of privilege risk.
 By passing vetting process, no visibility of data access due to inadequate business
process workow.
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 Lack of visibility and access control governance due to inadequate access control
policy verication and limited support for centralized identity repository. Pro-
cesses are manual, cumbersome and inconsistent between business units due to
missing streamlined access management process across business. This makes the
governance of Access Management becomes cumbersome as multiple silos systems
is resort to for validations.
Combining tasks-based assignment in conjunction with role-based will help make access
control more ecient and easier to use. This approach will assist by not adding further
to the already large number of proprietary authorisation systems that the organisation
must manage. Instead, it is a path to consistent access enforcement based on a single set
of organisation-wide security policies. An authorisation model for the enterprise should
support both active (task) and passive (role) access control, otherwise the dynamic en-
vironment permissions could be switched too early or too late, for example, in the case
of an emergency maintenance, passwords need to be assigned after an emergency and
revoked within 24 hours (completion). Role-based access control (RBAC) is a natural
paradigm to apply to authorisation in workow systems because of the correspondence
between tasks and permissions. A considerable amount of work has been done on the use
of RBAC to support access control in workow systems (Wainer et al. (2003)). However,
a role-based model alone is not sucient to meet all the authorisation requirements of
workow systems such as separation of duty constraints and binding of duty constraints.
Separation of duty requirements exist to prevent conicts of interest and to make fraud-
ulent acts more dicult to commit. A simple example of a separation of duty constraint
would be to require two dierent signatures on a cheque. Binding of duty constraints
require that if a certain user executed a task, then that user must also execute a second
task in the workow. Additionally, cardinality constraints are used to specify that a task
must be performed a given number of times, optionally by a given number of dierent
users. Role-based access control has its own set of limitations such as role explosion and
role-permission explosion (Rajpoot et al. (2015)).
Summary of limitation within existing access control model shown in Fig(2.20
From the literature review, gaps were identied within dynamic segregation of duty
constraints, workow authentication management, binding of duties, dynamic role change
mechanisms and enforcement of organisational policies. It is apparent from a gap analysis
of Bank X's access control authentication model that this organisation would require
a dynamic access control model to accommodate challenges it faces within the new
technology era, whilst minimising the data/security breach risk. Unauthorised access
could lead to elevation of privilege and it is now more important than ever to comply
with relevant privacy legislation.
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Figure 2.20: Existing access control models and it's limitations
2.13 Summary
This chapter critically analysed the notion of Identity Management, widely adopted
identity management models, and several expert's opinion survey. Literature review
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studies the evolution of identity management, concepts, identity management models,
provisioning model,identity and access management framework through to access control
model, this has been carried out through systematic literature survey to understand what
is known and limitation in the eld. Literature review then focuses on the adversaries
within the access control to understand the threats vectors and the risk to organisation
through breach reports and industrial experts (board of directors, security specialist)
opinions. Current identity and access management model have been studied of the case
study (investment bank) to derive requirements and current limitations and challenges
faced through emerging technology to protect assets from various adversaries and risks.
Various research has been carried out on identity and access management models over
the past decades and newer exible and hybrid models are currently under research for
the dynamic cloud environment and protocols; however, none has met the functional
requirements of the dynamic access control model providing access governance to ensure
access to resources authorised appropriately, logging capabilities, dynamic SoD at the
task instance level to ensure access is granted in real time and mitigation of broken access
control risk of privilege escalation.
The following chapter proposes methods that have been applied in this thesis to bridge
the gaps in the research within the dynamic access control to ensure requirements are
incorporated into the development of the AW-TRBAC model in chapter Four.
Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
This chapter outlines the research methods that were followed in the study. It provides
information on the participants, the criteria for inclusion in the study, the research design
that was chosen for this study and the reasons for this choice. The instrument that was
used for data collection is also described and the procedures that were followed to carry
out this study are included.
The aim of this research is to construct a conceptual dynamic access control model for
an investment bank. The objectives of the research are to identify the gaps in the Access
Control Management existing literature, to build upon existing knowledge through an
inductive approach, and solve a real-life problem with a chosen institution.
3.1 Research Methodology
The research methodology is a structured approach that species how research is to be
conducted and by which the research goes about the process of describing, explaining
and predicting hypothesis (Almalki (2016)). This thesis has used descriptive methods.
This is because descriptive research is helpful in identifying variables that can be tested,
subjects or participants are observed in a natural and unchanged environment, and the
data collection allows for gathering in-depth information that is qualitative (observations
or case studies) in nature. This allows for a multifaceted approach to data collection and
analysis. Descriptive studies result in large amounts of rich data.
3.2 Research Design
The research begins with the challenges faced by a real nancial institution. A review of
the related literature is performed to consider what the existing industry and research
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practices are, and where there are gaps in the literature. This research focuses on the
descriptive theory and the development of related concepts and procedures to facilitate
dynamic access control features for and existing access control model.
Figure 3.1: Summary of Research Design
When establishing research design, the following criteria were considered:
 Understand the problem from a real use case
 Establish a sound basis of knowledge about existing access control models
 Understand the requirements of a new dynamic access control model
 Verication of the proposed model using specication language
 Implementation of Proof of Concept (PoC) for Authorisation access control model
 Testing usefulness of the proposed model
The aims and objectives are considered based on the existing problems and research gaps
as shown in Fig 3.1. The proposed solution attempts to address these problems through
evaluation of the solution in order to achieve the research aims.
The analytical technique used for the research is that of a mixed empirical study. It con-
tains a use case, evidence pertaining to which has been obtained via personal experience,
observation and industrial experts opinion and survey. The information gathered has
been analysed and grouped into three parts: access control model, access governance,
and policy enforcement.
Another approach which has been used to analyse gaps in research is through a systematic
literature survey of the Identity Access Control Management (IAM), as shown in Fig 3.2.
This approach is common amongst the medical research eld where large volume of data
and this method of analysis assist in narrowing down to niche area, similarly IAM is well
researched are and have attracted vast interests from academia and industries due to
its importance. The systematic review has followed the quality reporting guidelines set
by the Preferred Reporting items for Systematic reviews and Meta-analysis (PRISMA)
group. A review was carried out with three research questions in mind;
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Figure 3.2: Data Analysis approach through systematic review method
1. What is the intensity of research activity in framework/model/best practices for
an IAM Solution in Information Security?
2. What IAM security functional taxonomy is being addressed in IAM development?
3. Which IAM Security taxonomy has been under-researched?
The literature review followed a systematic review process to ensure that the search and
the retrieval processes were accurate and impartial.
3.2.1 Inclusion Criteria
The following inclusion criteria were used: articles that are written in English, articles
related to the research topics: Identity access management, Identity access control within
the information security and security management eld. The search terms were applied
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to Google Scholar, IEEE explore, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, with a date
between 2010-2019, and the references included in the articles were also scanned to
obtain to ensure the review is fully comprehensive.
3.2.2 Study Selection
The study selections were organized using the four phases:
Phase one - Research publication related to Identity Access Management and Access
Control. This phase was searched using the string (Identity access management) AND
(Access Control OR solution), which was adapted to the search engine.
Phase Two - Exploration of Title, abstract, identied key words and selection based on
the eligibility criteria.
Phase Three - Complete and partial articles that had not been eliminated were read
to identify whether they were related to the eligibility criteria.
Phase Four - The reference lists were scanned to identify any further studies provided
that met the eligibility criteria.
Excluded Publication - These were publications on the topics of Role engineering
models, architectural details of IAM solutions.
3.2.3 Data Collection Process
An evaluation of articles revealed search engine Science direct and IEEE explore were
the best sources for the purpose of the topic in this report; after the initial search 4 steps
were followed:
 Query selection and search engine, initial search on identity access management
revealed 20,962 articles in various sectors from the date ranging from 2010-2019.
 Manual renement revealed that not all articles were related to the objectives
of this report; some were identied as being related to social sciences, medicine,
tourism, computers in human behaviour, IDM software development, and various
role-based models of information security.
 Verication. The title, abstract and content of each article was checked in order to
include or exclude based on the eligibility criteria.
 Classication of relevant publications. Classication of the publication was based
on functional areas of security, using the following categories: data security, audit-
ing, assurance, provisioning, compliance, policy and governance.
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3.3 Research Phases
The research was conducted in six phases as shown in Fig 3.3
Figure 3.3: Research conducted in six Phases
3.3.1 Phase 1 Initial Use Case - Identifying the Challenges
Having worked as a consultant for various Investment Banks over ten years, noticed the
challenges within the Access Management of complex banking applications setup, and
observed various data breaches, this led me to choose the use case as part of my Pro-
fessional Doctorate study to solve a real life challenge. Access Control Management has
been a challenge in organisations and especially vital in banking industries due to high
risk applications that support its investment decisions and operation. It is crucial that
access to resources are permitted to authorised users only, and that access is granted
in a timely manner. Access governance ensures that access to resources is authorised
appropriately, and accountability and traceability is retained. Access control and access
governance systems were in silos and it was necessary to have one streamlined process
and system to support that process. Such a system should be dynamic, with intelligence
to make a real-time decision based on policy rules which support both role-based and
task-based instance restrictions to meet Binding of Duties and Segregation of Duties.
An authorisation access control model was required, which could enforce role changes,
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ensuring old entitlements were revoked prior to granting new access, and ensuring ac-
cess has been authorised and governed appropriately, whilst SoD & BoD constraints
were retained. Case study has been appended in the appendix A.1, workshop has been
held with key stakeholder, Information Security Dept Head, Security Administrator and
Information Owner (Business approval director), to derive access governance process
workow.
3.3.2 Phase 2 Review of Literature - Identifying the Research Gaps
and Limitations
Access control and identity models (such as such as SSO, Authorisation Model, and
Authentication model) have received attention from a vast amount of research. However,
despite this research into identity and access control both in academia and industry,
identity access management remains challenging and the risk of unauthorised access to
resources or exploitation of vulnerabilities due to escalation of privilege remain high-level
threats for organisations. Although these gaps have been researched individually, they
have never been considered as a whole to develop a new access control model.
3.3.3 Phase 3 Proposed Solution - The development of the Dynamic
Access Control Model
The proposed solution AW-TRBAC (Authorising Workow Task Role Based Access Con-
trol) has been developed using the requirements identied in the use case and the gaps in
the literature review for such an access control model. AW-TRBAC used the concepts of
task and role from the widely adopted access control model RBAC and ABAC. Although
ABAC has received vast attention from academia, to date there hasn't been much adop-
tion within industry. ABAC is a framework of concepts and has been used in various
other access control models such as policy-based access control, and context-based access
control. Another element in AW-TRBAC is the workow task authorisation, which has
received little attention within academia, however AW-TRBAC has been able to incor-
porate both the role and task concepts. AW-TRBAC has met the challenge to build a
dynamic access control model which supports dynamic segregation of duties (instance
level restriction), real time activation of permission (task instance activation), workow
authorisation (governance), binding of duties (restriction of roles) and timely decision-
making enforcement based on the policy rules of the organisation through policy language
(XACML).
To full the policy enforcement a policy language was required, which supports the Role,
Task, Operation notation. XACML was chosen as the policy language which would work
well with the dynamic access control due to its cohesion and coupling ability, however, it
was lacking Task notation capability. To meet the Task requirements and the dynamic
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capability of role change and SoD, the XACML standard was extended to support the
additional functionalities. This extended XACML will add a Task authority function
for task related queries and a role enabling function combined with two additional data
stores which will be utilised during decision making and retaining audit trails.
The proposed solution has been implemented using open source XACML Engine (Chen
et al. (2013)). It was extended using an additional ve functions to be used as a policy
engine to query an XACML request and retrieve information from the data store and
compare against the policy before forwarding it to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) for
decision making.
3.3.4 Phase 4 Evaluation Usefulness of the Proposed Model
The evaluation of research ndings is related to the extent to which the data can be
generalised and how they are relevant and applicable to frameworks (Bryman (2016)),
The evaluation will be carried out using the use case requirements to run end-to-end
access request processes within the PoC system, and the results will be recorded to
check whether they will align with the use case policy rules and the task constraints.
Tests will be carried out using Java test scripts to run against the AW-TRBAC engine
for decision making.
The evaluation will be in two phases: the rst phase will test satisfaction of the use case
requirements, and the second phase will test applicability in real life.
 The First phase will analyse the requirements by running a test script, which will
record the results in a SQL Database and will use the SQL datastore to retrieve
information in other test cases.
 The second phase to analyse and record the system performance; results from the
tests will evaluated for applicability in real life.
3.3.5 Phase 5 Research Conclusion
The conclusion phase will summarise the ndings and limitations within the thesis. It
will summarise challenges, constraints, success and future work within the thesis and
summarise the journey of the thesis to reach its conclusion. It will also propose future
research into dynamic access control and how this could be used within the industry as
a fully developed solution.
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3.3.6 Limitations
Identity access management is very critical in every sector, including government, nance,
healthcare, retail, and defence. As security functions are interrelated it was dicult to
sepearate functions into a security taxonomy; however, the security functions have been
grouped in this systematic review into IAM solutions, data security, provisioning, and
compliance. Limitations within this exploratory systematic review are as follows:
 The search was conducted on various Databases and the choice of search strings
may have led to accidental exclusion of relevant articles.
 Literature were limited to only English language literature, there may have been
other non-English literature that was not included.
 Literature searches were manual and prone to error, there might have been litera-
ture which was incorrectly eliminated in the initial identication phase.
 Evaluation criteria used might not have been appropriate.
The limitations and disadvantages of the descriptive approach are:
 Descriptive studies cannot be used to correlate variables or determine cause and
eect.
 Condentiality can be an issue.
 Researcher bias may play a role in many ways. For example, the choice and wording
of questions for the questionnaire may be inuenced by the bias of the researcher, or
subjective choices could be made about which information to record and emphasize
in the ndings.
 No variables are manipulated, therefore statistical analysis is not possible.
 The results are not repeatable and typically the study cannot be replicated. Find-
ings may be open to interpretation.
3.4 Summary
The methods used to conduct this research is mixed method, an industrial use case work-
shop was setup to understand the process of access governance through workshop with
the key stakeholder with framing question to connect the dots in a complex environ-
ment and to analyse the gaps. Several experts opinion survey report and security breach
resulted due to access control adversaries were studied to understand impact of the gaps.
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The systematic review has followed the quality reporting guidelines set by the preferred
reporting items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) group. This is to
ensure that the search and the retrieval process have been accurate and impartial. It is
an approach that is typically used in medical clinical research where volume of data is
large in quantity and needed to be narrowed down to specic niche area, similarly IAM
eld has received vast amount of interest both from academia and industries due to it
importance in security and risk mitigation.
The next chapter is the main contribution of the thesis, which exhibit the characteristic
requirements into the development of the AW-TRBAC dynamic access control model,







This chapter presents the main contribution of the thesis, the dynamic access control
model. In chapter two an overview of the use case and a critical analysis of existing
identity and access control models has been studied. It has been observed there are
several limitations relating to workow governance and segregation of duties, especially
at instance level. Several silo access management systems are required to maintain access
control to resources.
This chapter exhibits the characteristics and requirements of a dynamic access control
model. Then it denes the concepts that are used to develop a conceptual model of
dynamic access control to bridge the gaps of dynamic SoD, governance and mitigates
broken access control risk. Later in the chapter, the concepts of dynamic constraints
have been proved mathematically using set theory for assertion on test scenarios.
Finally, in the chapter, rationalisation is provided for policy requirements and explain
the XACML standard that has been extended to meet the requirements for policy en-
forcement of the conceptual model.
4.1 Motivation for Dynamic Access Control Model
After reviewing the use case of the investment bank in conjunction with a review of the
access control model literature, it was apparent that there were certain aspects of access
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control that were not being studied or which did not have fully implemented solutions.
This provided the motivation to propose a dynamic access control model which will
provide real-time decision making intelligence.
RBAC is widely adopted access control model which supports passive access control and
have incorporated session concept of its dynamic separation of duties, which has not fully
met the requirement of for constraint within task instance enforcement that is required
in dynamic environments (Oh and Park (2000)). For example, issuer of a task cannot
be an approver for a task instance. However, it is possible for a user to be an approver
for one instance and be an issuer for another instance; this level of enforcement is not
possible within the role concept . The model of ABAC is a framework and can combine
with other access control models. However, its exibility is limited. DAC, MAC, RBAC,
and ABAC all provide security control from the point of the user but can't achieve
dynamic authorisation. Therefore, they are not suitable to meet the business workow
tasks constraints (JING and YANG (2006)). ABAC on the other hand separates access
right assignment for users and access right activation. The ABAC model has limitations
in the enterprise environment, ABAC does not deal with passive access control such as
role to permission mapping. Therefore, additional access control methods need to be
added to the ABAC model.
For an authorisation model to be able to work within a dynamic environment, it requires
the ability to support a specic set of characteristics, of which instance-level restrictions,
dynamic segregation of duties and binding of duties (BoD) are notable examples. This
thesis contributes to addressing the limitations of both RBAC and ABAC models, with
regards to tasks and the sequence of executing processes.
4.1.1 Requirements for Dynamic Access Control Model
From the analysis of the use case and the review of the existing access control models,
primarily RBAC (Ravi Sandhu et al. (1996)) and ABAC (Biswas et al. (2016)), a set
of characteristics and specications have been derived for the functional requirements
of the dynamic access control model. These requirements are necessary for dynamic
segregation of duties and access governance.
 Requirement 1: Access request shall only be submitted by the role Security
Coordinator.
 Requirement 2: Authorised Business Process Owner should approve the security
request.
 Requirement 3: Only authorised users shall be permitted access to resources.
 Requirement 4: User access to be revoked after termination of service and service
change.
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 Requirement 5: Service transfer through role change requires two level of Process
Owner approvals (departing service and onboarding) and revocation of existing and
provisioning of new credentials.
 Requirement 6: Sucient logging of events to be retained and monitored.
Requirements 1,2,3 have been addressed in various access control models independently
(Ferraiolo et al. (2001)), which are well-known and highly used in the security eld. There
are many variations of constraints of SoD, and despite various research approaches, it
remains challenging to implement in a dynamic environment. This thesis will focus on
requirements 4, 5, and 6, which are unique functional requirements for a dynamic access
control model to meet a dynamic borderless network environment. Requirement 5, which
allows for role changes, implies constraints of SoD, BoD, and revocation of access. These
are integral requirements which have dependencies on the functionalities associated with
the other requirements such as 2,3,4. This thesis focuses on the role change process and
associated dependencies with the other processes.
4.2 Conceptual View of the Dynamic Access Control Model
After dening the requirements, next component of the model is the concepts necessary
to dene the AW-TRBAC. It is based on existing identity and access control concepts
such as user, role, and permission and considers new concepts such as task, and IT
workow.
4.2.1 Conceptual View of the Dynamic Access Control Model
After dening the requirements, next component of the model is the concepts necessary
to dene the AW-TRBAC. It is based on existing identity and access control concepts
such as user, role, and permission and considers new concepts such as task, and IT
workow.
4.2.1.1 AW-TRBAC Concepts
The concept role focuses on an actor, and task focuses on an activity, and therefore
task is not sub-concept of role. It is possible to group permissions by role and task but
grouping permissions by role leads to role explosion. The key concept of AW-TRBAC
is that each role has specic tasks assigned to it. AW-TRBAC extends the standard
RBAC model by dening task elements and its relationship with role. With these exten-
sions, AW-TRBAC can support the additional expressibility requirements and remain
compatible with the RBAC standard. As in Fig 4.1 shows a high level abstract diagram
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of the two models: the standard RBAC model (bottom) and the AW-TRBAC (top).
RBAC is used as a base and it uses the notions of role, user, permission and session.
AW-TRBAC expands on the notion of tasks to support workow active access control to
provide more for dynamic access control behaviour, while retaining compatibility with
RBAC. AW-TRBAC supports workow tasks and dynamic role changes. Workow tasks
are distinguishing on the execution on the instances of the task via activation conditions
and the task execution list. The function task execution list assists in the instance level
restriction by using history-based information and provides an auditing function. It uses
the workow task notion to activate access rights using activation conditions, which
ensure that priority tasks are completed in a sequence of tasks before activating access.
Figure 4.1: AW-TRBAC Dynamic Access Control Models shaded in green represent the
notion of task to support workow active access control for dynamic access control behaviour
A workow authorisation model is important in information governance to keep track of
all the activities involving controlled access to resources. This information can provide
information security with a holistic view of who, what, how access to resources was
authorised. Having such information supports an organization's immediate and future
regulatory, legal, risk, environmental and operational requirements.
4.3 AW-TRBAC Conceptual View
The class diagram in Fig 4.2 that has been used in this thesis for the conceptual modelling
of workow authorisation models, describes the attributes and operations of a class
and the constraints imposed on the system. The class diagram shows a collection of
classes, associations, collaborations and constraints. Class diagrams are widely used in
the modelling of object-oriented systems because they are the only Unied Modelling
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Language UML diagrams which can be mapped directly with object-oriented languages.
User: Users are the subjects of access control, they execute their job function to achieve
the company's goal. They produce business information and this information is stored
for future business activities. They may use information resources that were created by
other employees.
Task: The concept of a task is a fundamental unit of business work or business activity.
Job function is another expression of task. Tasks are assigned to users by their job
positions or business roles. From the access control's point of view, users read or write
information objects when executing their tasks. Access rights are required only for
executing the assigned tasks. For example, material resource planning, check issuing,
purchase approval, and sales decision, are examples of tasks.
Workow: This is an IT term describing a business process. In general, it means
a product or method for supporting business processes in the enterprise environment.
The task approve customer orders belongs to the process receiving customer order.
Execution of tasks in the business process should proceed in a dened order and take
a dened amount of time. Although the task approve customer orders is assigned to
the user, they can activate their access rights only when the prior tasks check customer
credit and check product stock are completed. In this case, authorisation (access right
assignment) is separated from activation of access rights. This type of access control is
called active access control.
Resources: Information resources are the objects of access control, such as les, tables in
a database, executable programs, etc. Information resources contain business information
and support the execution of tasks within workow resources.
Business Process: This is a collection of linked tasks which nd their end in the
delivery of a service or product to a client. A business process has also been dened as a
set of activities and tasks that, once completed, will accomplish an organisational goal.
A business process is a function of access control management in information security.
Execution List: An execution list is a record of all users who performed certain tasks,
this will contain names, roles and tasks that have been performed by a user. It lists
transaction logs of an event that has been actioned by a certain user, which can be
used for incidence response root cause analysis and compliance. This is a critical control
within information security for data analytic as well.
As shown in Fig 4.2 class model of AW-TRBAC, it shows the class user, which has a
direct link to Business Process class, as a user belongs to a business process. Role class
has a composition relationship with the Task class, a role may have many tasks associated
with it. Workow is another class has three generalised classes Termination, Role Change
and Emergency Password (privileged account). Workow can have termination request,
role change request and Emergency Password request, each of the request has a task. An
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activation class has inheritance association with Task class and association link with Task
instance class, the task is only activated if the condition is met with the task. Execution
list class has inheritance relationship with the Task Instance ID class by obtaining the
list of executioners from the execution task class for historical information.
Figure 4.2: Static structure diagram which describes the structure of the AW-TRBAC
system by showing the system's classes, their attributes, operations (or methods), and the
relationships among objects
4.4 Mathematical Model of Task Entailment Constraints
In this section of the thesis, the task constraints and task entailment constraints are
analysed against the use case requirements using theory algorithms.
4.4.1 Task Constraints
Firstly, task approval constraints are described based on binary relations dened on the
set of users. Such relations are expressive, intuitive and can be manipulated algebraically,
enabling to derive new constraints that simplify the analysis of workows.
O = {o}, A = {a}, and P = {o ∩ a} (4.1)
Let O denote the set of all objects subject to access control, A the set of all actions
that can be performed on those objects, and P the permission, is the set of all OBJECTS
and ACTIONS:
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Set Theory Label
O Denotes the set of all objects subject to access
control
A The set of all actions that can be performed on
those objects
P The permission
U Denote all the authenticated subject users
R Is the role, function
URA User role assignment is many to many user-to-
role assignments
S A list of all sessions
TY Task type
RTA Role-to-task permission
T Is the set of all tasks in the system
TPA Task-to-permission
W Denotes workow
AC Denotes activation condition
BW Denotes the business workow
AU Auditing of task instance
PI Denotes a process instance
RTA Role-to-task permission
TI Task instance
DC Termination of account
IR Denote an instance level restriction
Table 4.1: Set Theory Label
Let U denote all the authenticated subject users and R is the role, function, or
position, that somebody has, or is expected to have, in an organization. URA user role
assignment is many to many user-to-role assignments
{u}R = {r} and URA ⊆ UxR. (4.2)
Let denote S a list of all sessions, it is a function that return all activated roles for
a user. A user can only activate assigned roles thereby an activated role (session) is a
subset of all assigned roles=s,
s(u) = { active session for the user u} , s(u) = {r} and {r} ⊆ (R ∩ r active for user u).
(4.3)
A user can obtain permission through activating role u=uc, s(uc) ⊆URA and s(u) 6= .
Let TY denote Task Type W Workow tasks and N NON-WORKFLOW tasks. T
is the set of all tasks in the system, a unique task ID which is Natural no, p is the
permission and task type.
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TY = {ty},W = {w}, N = {n}, ty = {w ∩ n}, ID = {N},
P = {p}, T = (TY ∩N ∩ P )andt = {ty ∩ n ∩ p}.
(4.4)
TPA task-to-permission, which is many to many mapping and RTA role-to-task per-
mission, which has many to many mappings.
TPA ⊆ T ∩ P,RTA ⊆ R ∩ T, r ∈ s{u} and {t ∩ r} ⊆ RTA (4.5)
Proposition 1. Let BW denote the business workow, it contains the name N of
the Business workow and T, the task. TPA task-process-assignment is one-to-many
mappings.
BW = {bw}, bw = (n ∩ t) and TPA ⊆ T ∩ bw. (4.6)
Let PI denote a process instance of a business workow; process instances can be exe-
cuted many times for a business workow. TI denotes task instances for this particular
process instance. TI have ST (status assignment active, unassigned, and completed).
PI = {pi}, pi = (bw ∩ n), T I = {ti} and ti = {t ∩ st ∩ n}. (4.7)
AU is the auditing of task execution, and is a function mapping between completed
task instances and the user who performed it.
AU : ti→ u ⊆ Uandti ∈ TI ∩ ti(st) = completed (4.8)
Proposition 2. Let AC denote the activation condition task which will activate if
satised and not activate otherwise; it can take the values TRUE or FALSE.
AC : ti ∈ TIv ∈ {true, false}andAC(tin) = true i St(tin− 1) = completed.
′DC ′ Termination of account DC : ti ∈ TIv ∈ true, False and
AC(tin) = true i St(tin− 1) = completed.
(4.9)
SoD Segregation of Duties, NIST RBAC identies pair of roles cannot be assigned at the
same time (static), r1, r2 ∈ R,
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SoD − type ∈ static, dynamicandSoD = (r1, r2, sod− type), (4.10)
SoD and a pair of roles cannot be activated both session simultaneously (dynamic) if r1
∈s(u) → r2 /∈ s(u).
Proposition 3. Let IR denote an instance level restriction. There are two types of
instance level restriction, segregation of duties (SoD) and binding of duties (BoD), These
segregation are at the instance level as opposed to role level in RBAC.
AU connects the task-instance with the user who performed the task for that specic
instance, before allowing the user to activate a `ti' task instance. The AW-TRBAC
authorisation engine checks the `ir's that apply to this `ti'. It then uses the AU function to
identify if the requesting user would violate an `ir' instance restriction for those tasks that
have SoD restriction on the process i.e. issuer and approver, if the task were performed
by them.
ir ∈ IR, type ∈ {SoD,BoD}, ti1 ∩ ti2 ∈ TI, ir = (ti1, ti2, type)
and ir = (t1i, t4j, SoD)→ u ∈ AU(t1i) and u ∈ AU(t4j)iffi 6= j
(4.11)
4.4.2 Task Entailment Constraints Within the Workow
This section depicts the task constraints within the workow, to activate certain per-
missions to perform a task, it requires completion of previous tasks within the workow.
Using set theory algorithms to describe the task entailment within the requirements
identied, for the dynamic access control model proposed in this thesis.
 Access request can only be submitted by the Security Coordinator. (Security
request, coordinator) ∈ TRA.
 Security requests can only be approved by the authorised Managers.
(Ir = (Securityrequest, Approve, SoD)),
If u ∈ AU(Securityrequest)→ u 6⊂ AU(Approve)
(4.12)
 Only requests approved by the approving managers can obtain access to resources.
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 A transfer request requires two levels of management approval: from the depart-
ment the user is transferring from and the department they are transferring to.
AC (Role change access rights) = true if (st (Transfer request)
= completed) ∩ (transferrequestapproval1) = completed ∩
(transferrequestapproval2) = completed
(4.15)
 Closing request requires completion of security request and access rights grant-
ed/revoked
AC(closeSecurityRequest) = trueiff(st(Securityrequest)
= completed ∩ st(accessrightsgranted) = completed).
AC(closeTerminationRequest) = trueif(st(Deactivateaccessrights)
= completed ∩ st(Terminateusersession) = completed).
(4.16)
 Security Coordinator cannot be a security administrator.
(SoD = (coordinator,Administrator, static)).
if(Administrator, u) ∈ URA ∩ (coordinator, uc) ∈ URAu 6= uc
(4.17)
 Emergency password issuer and the checker should be Security Administration
team.
(Ir = (issueEmergencypassword, check − inEmergencypassword,BoD)
AU(issueEmergencyPassword) = {SecurityAdministrationTeam}
(4.18)
4.4.3 Analysis of Use Case Requirement Constraints
This section revisits the use case to analyse the requirements using set theory algorithms.
A set of case scenarios have been constructed to mathematically test the constraints.
First test case: Termination of access rights assume a change role request received
from HR, security coordinator Amy would like to log the request.
Proposition 1. The rst thing the system will do is check to see if Amy can log a
request (she has a Security coordinator role assigned to her):
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(Amy, coordinator) ∈ URA (4.19)
Is there violation of SoD rules by activating this role? If not, the system will then allow
Amy to activate this role,
s(Amy) = coordinator? (4.20)
After receiving the notication of a Change Role (transfer) request through the email,
Amy (as a coordinator) wants to submit Transfer request.
(t(id) =)forinstancenumbere.g.1(n = 2) (4.21)
First the system identies if this role can perform this task.
(Transferrequest, coordinator) ∈ TRA. (4.22)
The system then identies the instance number and knows that Amy wants to perform
a task-instance. It will also check the IR restriction to show that status is unassigned
and no one has performed this task instance.
The = (unassigned, Transferrequest, 2).Ir(TerminationRequest) = null). (4.23)
The activation condition of this task instance is `Transfer e-mail received'
AC(TransferRequest2) = trueiffst(Transfere−mailreceived) = completed,
(4.24)
The Activation condition of the task `Role change access rights' will only be true if the
task `Transfer_request_approval' has been completed. Otherwise the Transfer Request
condition will be false, and no one can perform the task yet.
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Proposition 2. Role Change (within the same department): User remains in the same
department, but moves on to a new business function.
AC(Rolechangeaccessrights) = trueiff(st(Transferrequest) = completed)∩
(transferrequestapproval) = completed
(4.25)
Complex role change (departmental transfer). Departmental transfer requires two levels
of approval, the rst approval from the department that the user is transferring from
shows that the user is leaving this department, the second approval from the department
that the user will be transferred to is an ocial approval that user will be working in
this new department.
AC(Rolechangeaccessrights) = trueif(St(Transferrequest) = completed)∩
(transferrequestapproval1) = completed ∩ (transferrequestapproval2) = completed
(4.26)
As the restrictions state that it should not be the same person to submit a request and
approve it,
(ir = (Securityrequest, Approve, SoD)). (4.27)
The system will check the Auditing execution list of the task `Transfer request':
AU(TransferRequest) = Amy (4.28)
Activation condition for the Closing Transfer request would only be true if both tasks,
role change access rights activated, and existing access rights revoked, are completed.
AC(closeTransferRequest) = trueiff(st(RoleChangeaccessrights) = completed∩
st(existingaccessrightsrevoked) = completed).
(4.29)
Proposition 3: Security request to be closed by the Coordinator Closing a security
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request follows the rule of instance level restriction, and the Security Coordinator who
submits the request will need to close the request.
(Ir = (submitrequest, closetherequest, BoD)AU(submitrequest) = Coordinator,
(4.30)
Similarly, for Privileged access management
(Ir = (issueEmergencypassword, check − inEmergencypassword,BoD)
AU(issueEmergencyPassword) = SecurityTeam
(4.31)
4.5 Policy Specication Requirements
When data is owing in the workow, the user performing the task is changing and the
user's permissions are changing too. This is related to the context of the data processing,
due to the characteristics of the workow system, the workow is not only to correctly
simulate the steps of the execution, but also to properly simulate rules to be followed
and constraints maintained during the execution of the business. An authorisation policy
language which can provide how access control policies are expressed in a manner that can
be enforced in an information system. One authorisation policy language that has become
widely used and accepted is the extensible Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML)
(Leitner et al. (2011)), an XML dened standard language for authorisation policies.
(Celino et al. (2007)) showed that XACML by itself is not enough to support all types of
authorisation models. The XACML standard has been further extended to incorporate
the Role notion to support RBAC policies; this extended XACML is known as XACML-
RBAC (Celino et al. (2007)). Neither XACML nor the XACML-RBAC standard can
accommodate the notion of tasks or task instances, therefore instance-level restrictions
are not supported. This motivated me to extend the XACML de facto standard to
support workow processes. There is currently no published work or implemented to the
knowledge of the author that extends the XACML language to support authorisation
policies for IT workow processes.
4.5.1 Access Control Policy Enforcement
As stated previously, this research extends the XACML standard to support the imple-
mentation of dynamic access control, to meet the use case requirements and enforce the
rules of the dynamic access control model through policy language. XACML supports
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the notation of the proposed dynamic access control model, such as role, task, and op-
eration, so that it can act as policy enforcement, which interacts with the access control
model to make decisions. The focal point of this research is on dynamic role changes,
SoD, BoD functionality and security requirements to enhance the risk posture and visi-
bility. To satisfy the use case requirements, ve new functions and two new data stores
have been introduced: SoD check, BoD check, Role check, Role change check and Role
change approve checks, which are utilised by the XACML policy engine in the decision
making. These extended functions enable the dynamic access control model to provide
real time history-based instance-level segregation to mitigate the risks of broken access
control and insucient logging of events. XACML is an OASIS standard that denes
a general-purpose access control and authorisation system (Rissanen et al. (2013)). It
consists of a policy language based on XML and a processing system that knows how
to interpret the policy with respect to the relevant application. The policy language is
used to create policies whereby each policy lists the requirements to access a resource in
a protected environment.
Figure 4.3: XACML Architecture and its interactions with various components PEP, PDP,
PIP and PAP for a request evaluation OWASP (2017)
As depicted in Fig 4.3, the major components of XACML Standard are; Policy Adminis-
tration Point (PAP), which handles creating and managing all policies. Policy Enforce-
ment Point (PEP), which handles intercepting users' requests and enforcing XACML
decisions received from the Policy Decision Point (PDP). Policy Decision Point (PDP)
handles evaluating users' requests based on the existing policies and return XACML deci-
sions to the PEP. Finally, Policy Information Point (PIP) facilitates gathering additional
attributes of a user.
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4.5.2 Extension of XACML Standard
This research extends the RBAC XACML OASIS standard and introduces two new
repositories called Role Change store and Role Assigned Task store, and ve new func-
tions SoD check, BoD check, Role Check, Role Change check and Role change approve
check (coloured in blue) in Fig 4.4. Each function is utilised for a dierent security
request, for example SoD Check will be utilised for requests that require segregation of
duty constraints on the submitter and approver roles; functions also contain conditional
obligations to enforce policy rules.
Figure 4.4: Showing Extended XACML Standard, shaded in blue components developed
to meet AW-TRBAC dynamic access control behaviours
The context handler in Fig 4.5 is responsible for translating received requests into the
XACML context and translating the results back to the native language of the other sys-
tem. It is also responsible for communicating between the other components. In XACML
the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is responsible for making decisions on the authorisation
requests based on the policy sets. With RBAC-XACML (OWASP (2017)) there is a new
type of request that deals with role activation; it was decided that role activation should
be out of the scope of PDP. For this reason, the Role Enablement Authority (REA) was
introduced as part of the standard development. REA is a specialised repository that
will have a policy store to support the decision making in role activation. AW-TRBAC
has a new type of request, to perform a workow task. To deal with such a request, new
functions have been added to provide input to the PDP for decision making.
As shown in the Fig 4.5, a sequence of events of task execution and authorisation are
required before a decision is made in response to a request, and the outcome is access
to authorised resources. This sequence of event needs to be executed in an orderly
manner and a just in time decision need to be made based on the evaluation of various
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Figure 4.5: A sequence of events of task execution and authorisation are required to be
executed in an orderly manner and a just in time decision need to be made based on the
evaluation of various components of XACML in AW-TRBAC access control
components of XACML for the dynamic access control to function as required. PAP
loads the SoD Policy set by the REA. When Context Handler (CH) receives a request
for role activation from the PEP, it will forward the request to the Role function to
query on SoD function to retrieve rules related to this request in Fig 4.5. In parallel to
this, CH will query the Role function to get the user's active roles and will forward the
information to the REA and a decision will be made based on evaluation of the SoD
policy set and the Role Task policy set. the decision will be sent to the CH which will
forward it to the PEP. CH will also update the user's role to add the new role if it was
activated in the Role data store. The task activation sequence proceeds as follows in
Fig 4.5. The Role Policyset will be loaded into the PDP and the IR Policy set by the
TA Authority via Policy Administration Point (PAP). When a task activation request
is sent to the CH by PEP, it will forward the request to the TA to check instance-level
rules for any related instance-level restrictions. CH will use the Executioner List (EL)
data store to get the historical information about the user completed the task instance.
After retrieving this information, CH will forward it to the TA to decide on the request.
The decision will then be sent to the CH. If the decision was `deny', then CH will send
`deny' to Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). If it was allow, then CH will query the Role
Task repository to get all the permissions related to this task. CH will create a resource
request for each permit and send it to the PDP. Finally, a decision on the permit will
be made using the combining algorithm deny Override will be sent to the CH, and the
nal decision will be sent to PEP. CH will also update the Executioner list to add the
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new activated task instance
Task activation sequence entails in Fig 4.5, Role Policyset will be loaded to the PDP and
the IR Policy set by the TA (Task Authority) via PAP. When a task activation request
is sent to the CH by PEP, it will forward the request to the TA to check Instance level
rules for any related in-stance-level restrictions. CH will use the Executioner List (EL)
data store to get the historical information about the user completed the task instance.
After retrieving the information CH will forward the information to the TA to decide
on the request. The decision will then be sent to the CH If the decision was `deny' then
CH will send `deny' to PEP. If it was allow then CH will query Role-Task repository
to get all the permissions related to this task. CH will create a resource request for each
permit and send it to the PDP. Finally, a decision on the permit using the combining
algorithm deny Override will be sent to the CH and the nal decision will be sent to
PEP. CH will also update the Executioner list to add the new task instance activated.
4.5.3 Structure of XACML Policy Request
Requests from various users are sent to the policy engine to be authorized by one or more
policies. The requests need to be composed in a structured way that can be utilised by the
policy execution engine. A policy request is divided into three parts: subject, resource,
attribute and action.
Subject: A subject is dened as the user (whom the request originated from) and is
implemented in XACML as User.
Objects: Objects are expressed using XACML Resources such as les, or web services.
Operations are ex-pressed using XACML Actions.
Permission: Permission gives the ability or right to perform some action on some
resource, possibly only under certain specied conditions.
Attribute: In this Prole, the term attribute refers to an XACML <attributes>.
An XACML attributes is an element in an XACML Request having among its com-
ponents an attribute name, identier, a data type identier, and an attribute value.
Each is associated either with one of the subjects (Subject Attribute), the protected
resource (Resource Attribute), the action to be taken to the resource (Action Attribute),
or the environment of the Request (Environmental Attribute). Attributes are refer-
enced in a policy by using an <AttributeSelector> (an XPath expression) or one of
the following:<SubjectAttributeDesignator>, <Re-sourceAttributeDesignator>, <Ac-
tionAttributeDesignator>, or <EnviornmentAttributeDesignator>.
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4.6 Comparison with Another Workow Model
Other authorisation models have been compared to AW-TRBAC in Fig 4.6. The criteria
used for comparison of AW-TRBAC with other authorisation models are gaps identied
in the development of the access control model in Fig 4.6. AW-TRBAC is a unique
authorisation model which supports dynamic access control model characteristics such
as dynamic SoD, governance and mitigation of broken access control risk. AW-TRBAC is
an independent model that has policy enforcement components to support access control
in a dynamic environment, such as a de-parameterised environment that requires access
to networks from various endpoints. It has the ability to restrict access based on dynamic
role changes through policy enforcement using a policy engine and a data store. This
ensures that users have access to resources based on the most up-to-date role assigned to
them, preventing escalation of privilege; this is an enhancement in comparison to all other
access control models. Additional focus has been on risk mitigation through activity
logs and accurately restricting sequences of task activation based on task constraints,
ensuring tasks are followed through in a sequence. This has provided governance of the
access management, which was identied as lacking in the literature review. With its
architecture based on the XACML standard, AW-TRBAC is designed to form the basis
of an enterprise-wide access control system that can integrate with existing architecture
and applications.
Figure 4.6: Comparison of AW-TRBAC with other authorisation models based on gaps
identied in the development of the access control model
4.7 Summary
This is the rst and second contributions of the thesis. First Contribution, The devel-
opment of the AW-TRBAC model to solve an industrial access control problem. It's
characteristics that have been designed, based on the gaps in the literature and expert
opinions derived from the various industrial surveys. The conceptual model has been
tested mathematically through set theory algorithm and shown to prove the constraint
requirements.
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The Second contribution of this thesis is the extension of the XACML standard to meet
the additional functional requirements, addition of the customised functions such as SoD
Check, BoD Check, Role Check, Role change check and Role approve check. To the
author's knowledge there has been no such extension exist to date and it rst of it's
kind.
Finally AW-TRBAC have been compared against the existing access control models
based on the criteria which are the gaps identied in the development of the access control
model, to illustrate it's unique characteristics and functionality toward the contribution
to the knowledge in dynamic access control model to mitigate risk.
Next chapter describes the design & implementation of the AW_TRBAC Policy engine
that has been developed to enforce the policy constraints through custom functions that
have been implemented using open source engine to meet the requirements of complete





So far in the chapter four, a dynamic access control model has been dened for the on
premise, which can be used for cloud deployment based on Workow Task Access Control.
This work has been extended using XACML-based policy language that can express the
requirement as policies and can validate the access control model using concepts of IT
workow task. This chapter expands all this work by implementing an AW-TRBAC
policy engine, which provides the necessary APIs for integration of authorising model
and policies.
This chapter presents the architecture, design and implementation of the AW-TRBAC,
which is designed to be scalable and distributed in nature. It also provides a high-
level overview of the implementation of the solution, and its integration with the Access
Control Service.
5.1 System Architecture
XACML architecture is distributed in nature, less dependencies (low coupling) and re-
duced module complexity (high cohesion), which makes a viable solution to use as the
base for our task-based access control architecture. Figure 5.1 shows the AW-TRBAC
architecture, which extends the ve core components of the XACML architecture to
support Instance restriction for enforcement of use case logic.
To facilitate the additional functionality capabilities, dynamic SoD and IR (instance
level Restriction), we are extending the XACML framework with ve new functions:
Role Check, Check SoD, Check Bod, Role Change, Role Approval and two new data
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stores Role Change and Executioner List. The PDP functionalities are extended by
using Context Handler to query the additional functions which then forwarded to PDP
for decision making.
Figure 5.1: Shows the AW-TRBAC architecture, which extends the ve core components
of the XACML architecture to support Instance restriction for enforcement of use case logic
The choice of technology implementation is crucial for the adoption of the framework of
the industry. It is paramount to use mature technology and widely adopted standard
to reduce the complexity and ease of integration. A model of AW-TRBAC has been
designed to illustrate the illustrate the framework proposed for access control model.
The architecture in Fig 5.1 various components of the AW-TRBAC. Each component is
discussed in turn.
In this thesis, the Web portal is the main entry point to the AW-TRBAC using REST
API request which is then processed by extracting various information from the request
into an XACML equivalent request. The next component is the Authorisation to access
secured resource/service. User identity will be veried against the XACML policies
which then executes the AW-TRBAC engines (extends the XACML engine) leveraging
data store, task services and policy stores to provide correct permission required for the
roles, decision is then passed on to the PEP module to direct to a service.
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5.2 System Design
This section explains the design of the AW-TRBAC policy engine, which entails various
API interfaces between AW-TRBAC portal and XACML translator, AW-TRBAC engine
and the Database connectivity. API connectivity that will be implemented is with REST
API and the Connectivity API which will be Java Spring Framework (Perez et al. (2019)).
5.2.1 Access Portal API
This is the initial point of access to resources in invoking various authorization requests.
The invocation is made through a series of REST calls. There is a total of three REST
URI's for the portal: Role_change, SOD and BOD.
5.2.1.1 Role Change URI
This section describes the URI for the Role Change Request within the AW-TRBAC
portal, for illustration purpose this thesis explains the Role Change Requirements design
below and subsequent requirements appended in Appendix A.
The URI for the role change is as follows:
1 http://profdoc.uel.ac.uk/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/{operation}
The following operations are supported: initial_request, rst_manager_approval,
second_manager_approval and close_request
The initial Role Change request operation for role change is as follows:
1 http://profdoc.uel.ac.uk/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/initial_request
The request body contains a JSON document in Table 5.8, that consists of: UserId,
RoleId, TaskId and ResourceId. These values are extracted and used by the AW-TRBAC
engine to validate the request.
Response:
A successful response would return a 201 HTTP response as shown in Table 5.2, with
JSON body containing the TaskInstanceid and status. An unsuccessful response would
contain HTTP 400 code.




Request Body UserId - Unique identier of a subject (user)
RoleId- Unique identier of a role
TaskId- Unique identied of an IT workow
ResourceId - Unique service/object id
Request format JSON
Action POST / awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/initial_request
Table 5.1: REST - Role Change Initial Request, the URI for the Role Change Request
within the AW-TRBAC portal
Response Parameter
Resource Information Description
Response Code HTTP/1.1 201 created
Response Error HTTP/1.1 400 bad request
Response Body TaskInstanceid, status
Response format JSON
Table 5.2: REST- Role Change Initial Response extracted and used by the AW-TRBAC
engine to validate the request from the value of UserId, RoleId, TaskId and ResourceId
An example of REST HTTP Request/Response for Role change, as shown in the Fig 5.2
"Bob" is making an initial role change request.
5.2.2 First Manager Approval REST URI
This section describes the URI for the Role Change Request within the AW-TRBAC
portal, for illustration purpose this thesis explains the Role Change Requirements design
below and subsequent requirements appended in Appendix.
The URI for the role change is as follows:
1 http://profdoc.uel.ac.uk/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/{operation}
The following operations are supported: initial_request, rst_manager_approval, sec-
ond_manager_approval and close_request
The initial Role Change request operation for role change is as follows:
1 http://profdoc.uel.ac.uk/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/first_approval








4 Content length: nnn
5








14 Response: HTTP/1.1 210 Created
15 { "response": {
16 "TaskInstanceid": "t001",
17 "status":"successfully created role change request"
18 }
19 }




Request Body UserId - Unique identier of a subject (user)
RoleId- Unique identier of a role
Taskid- Unique identied of an IT workow
RsourceId - Unique service/object id
Request format JSON
Action POST / awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/rst_approval
Table 5.3: REST - Role Change First Approval Request the URI for the Role Change
Request within the AW-TRBAC portal
The rst_approval is only executed after successful role change initial request. The
rst_approval REST request also has a JSON body, which takes the UserId, RoleId,
Taskid and RsourceId as inputs. The request is submitted as a HTTP POST.
Response:
A HTTP response of 201 or 400 is returned depending on the outcome of the response.
For a successful response, a JSON body with TaskInstanceid and status is returned.
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Response Parameter
Resource Information Description
Response Code HTTP/1.1 201 created
Response Error HTTP/1.1 400 bad request
Response Body TaskInstanceid, status
Response format JSON
Table 5.4: REST - Role Change First Approval Response is executed after successful role
change initial request, AW-TRBAC engine validate the request from the value of UserId,
RoleId, TaskId and ResourceId
5.3 Dynamic Role Change
Dynamic role change is another requirement identied during characteristics and require-
ment analysis of Dynamic Access Control (AW-TRBAC). In addition to SoD check as
tested above, Role change requires additional conditional statements, it requires two lev-
els of verication rstly terminating the existing role then provisioning the onboarding
role. Second level verication is the governance, which is approved by the departing role
manager and onboarding role manager. In both verication simulation will be using the
below scripts, policies, functions, data stores and security request submitted via REST
API.
5.3.1 Second Manager Approval REST URI







Request Body UserId - Unique identier of a subject (user)
Taskid- Unique identied of an IT workow
TaskInstanceId - Unique identier of task instance
Request format JSON
Action POST /awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/second_approval
Table 5.5: REST - Role Change Second Approval Request, the URI for the Role Change
Request within the AW-TRBAC portal
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Response Code HTTP/1.1 201 created
Response Error HTTP/1.1 400 bad request
Response Body TaskInstanceid, status
Response format JSON
Table 5.6: REST - Role Change Second Approval Response is executed after successful
role change rst approval, AW-TRBAC engine validate the request from the value of UserId,
RoleId, TaskId and ResourceId
A successful validation of second approver update the system data store and responses
with HTTP 200 code, otherwise a HTTP 400 code is returned.
5.3.2 Close Request REST URI






Request Body UserId - Unique identier of a subject (Manager)
Taskid- Unique identied of an IT workow
TaskInstanceId - Unique identier of task instance
Request format JSON
Action POST /awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/close_request
Table 5.7: REST - Role Change Close Request, the URI for the Role Change close out
Request within the AW-TRBAC portal
The close request takes in the UserId, TaskId and TaskInstanceId as the JSON input.
Response
The HTTP 200 response code, indicates a successful close of the request.
To summarise, the SoD URI will support the following operations: initial_request,
role_ manager, manager_approval and for BOD: initial_request, role_ coordinator,
close_request operations.
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Response Parameter
Resource Information Description
Response Code HTTP/1.1 201 created
Response Error HTTP/1.1 400 bad request
Response Body status
Response format JSON
Table 5.8: REST - Role Change Close Request after successful validation of second ap-
prover update on the system data store and responses with HTTP 200
5.4 System Implementation
The choice of language for implementation is Java (Gosling (2000)), as there are widely
available technologies, framework and open sourced project in Java, which are mature
and secure. Some of the technologies such as JAXB (Fialli and Vajjhala (2003)) has
wide community support. JAXP (Sun Microsystem), JAX-RS (Li (2011)) are used to
develop the backbone of the framework, that includes processing and handling of XML
(Bray et al. (1998)), which has REST based API interaction amongst the framework
components with Tomcat back-end Server. Spring framework is typically used which is
implemented in Java.
The core part of the system is the AW-TRBAC engine. Approach to implementing
the engine has been to leverage on the latest industry standard XACML 3.0 (Rissanen
(2010)). The open source implementation of this standard is the Balana (Chen et al.
(2013)) by WS02. The XACML 3.0 is currently the widely-supported standard in the
industry.
5.4.1 Task Workow Support for XACML
This section describes the implementation of the function in AW-TRBAC engine as
part of the extended XACML Standard. We describe each function in turn and explain
the mechanism involved in the coupling of policy assertion within policies and data
store. Workow task has been supported by xacml 3.0 by extending some of the core
functionality as shown in the in Fig 5.3. This research added dynamic access control
requirement within XACML 3.0 by extending some of its core functionalities. Figure 5.3
& 5.4 shows the extended functionalities required for the XACML engine to execute an
AW-TRBAC policy and request.
5.4.2 Coupling of Policy Assertions
The policies within the XACML reliant on the requests, as it contains conditional state-
ment and target which are derived from the requests to make a decision to allow or deny
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resource access.
IT workow task on the other hand is not solely dependent on the request values. This
requires XACML XPath functions to operate on the data store. However, they restricted
to content' XML from the request. While it may take some values from the request,
policies are primarily focused on the data from the Data stores for its assertions. A
new function of target is introduced to meet the additional requirement to provide the
dynamic SoD instance level restriction.
5.4.3 Function Role Check
The target statements for this function (dened as an ID) are handled by this function
it matches against the Role store (see 1a, 1b and 1c in Fig 5.3 below).
1 urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-check
When request is received the function checks the user ID against the role within the user
role store, if the user role match is true then it updates the Role Assigned Data store
with the entry and response back with decision true or false.
Figure 5.3: Implementation of the function in AW-TRBAC engine as part of the extended
XACML Standard to support dynamic access control requirement for SoD and BoD.
5.4.4 Static & Dynamic Segregation of Duties Check (SoD)
IT workow task require static and dynamic SoD for its statements. One statement
may generate reference IDs stored in a variable, which is later required/used by another
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Figure 5.4: Implementation of the function in AW-TRBAC engine as part of the extended
XACML Standard to support dynamic access control requirement for role change
statement. Such a concept is not present in XACML. To address this issue, this research
introduced another function:
1 urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:sod-check
The `instanceid' and `new' variables are declared in the target section of the policy. The
instanceid values are extracted from the input request type (e.g. Subject) compared
against the subject ID in the role assigned task store to check that the submitter is not
an approver and a new status of the task instance is stored in the role assigned task
store see 2a-2d in Fig 5.3. For a `new' variable it creates an entry in the store for the
statement, assertion see 3a-3b in Fig 5.3. The content is of a new variable populated
and used by the conditional statements, see below Section 5.4.6.
5.4.5 Static & Dynamic Binding of Duties (BoD)
IT workow task requires Binding on Duties (BoD), which entails match ID against
the instance ID in the target section of policy. To address this functionality, we have
introduced another function:
1 urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:bod-check
The `instanceid' and `new' variables are declared in the target section of the policy. The
instanceid values are extracted from the input request type (e.g. subject) compared
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against the subject ID in the role assigned task store for match and a new status of the
task in-stance is stored in the role assigned task store see 3a-3c in Fig 5.3.
5.4.6 Single to Multiple Mapping (Role Change)
XACML conditional statements are single value entry attributes, whereas IT workow
task statements are multi-valued parameters. To map single-to-multi-values, we have
created a fourth new function:
1 urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-change-check
This function rst obtains the attribute value of an XACML policy conditional statement
(this value needs to be a unique ID). It uses this as an xPath reference to a role Policy.
If a match is found, the role and its properties are matched against the Role Change
store. If all is successful, it will return true, otherwise false see 4a-4d in Fig 5.3.
5.4.7 Single to Multiple (Role Change Approver Check)
For the static & a dynamic change of role it requires single to multiple valued parameter
with multiple conditional statement and policy enforcement to generate an outcome
result to grant/deny. This function it the most complex function, it carries out two levels
of approver check; one for existing managers in the existing department to approve the
task role change, then the onboarding manager approval for the new role change. To carry
out task in sequence and carry out SoD check three dierent policies are incorporated
in a conditional statement with variable parameters. To solve this issue a fth function
has been created.
1 urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-change-approve-check
The second condition of this function is to carry out 1st approver checks before 2nd
approval, it obtains the attribute value of an XACML policy conditional statement (this
value needs to be a unique ID). It uses this as an xPath reference to a role Policy. If a
match is found, the role and its properties are matched against the Role Change store
and Business process. It then checks 1st authorisers instance in Role assigned task store,
it approves the request. if all successful it will return true, otherwise false see in Fig 5.4.
For a `new' variable it creates/check for an entry and in the role change store and the
Role assigned task store for the statement assertion. The content is of a new variable
populated and used by the conditional statements.
Chapter 5 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AW-TRBAC MODEL 81
1 urn: uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-change-approve-check
This condition of this function is to carry out the BoD duties check, it obtains the
attribute value of an XACML policy conditional statement (this value needs to be a
unique ID). It uses this as an xPath reference to a role Policy. If a match is found,
the role and its properties are matched against the Role Assigned Task store, if all
successful, it will return true, otherwise false see 7a-7c in Fig 5.4. For a `new' variable
it creates/check for an entry in the Role assigned task store for the statement assertion.
The content is of a new variable populated and used by the conditional statements.
5.5 AW-TRBAC Model Integration
The Service has been integrated with the AW-TRBAC system. The service can generate
and store its task instance audit trail data and apply task-based enforcements
Figure 5.5: AW-TRBAC portal Dynamic Access Control Model Integration, demonstrates
the interactions between the system components and the service to allow authorised access
to resources
The sequence diagram in Fig 5.5 demonstrates the interactions between the system com-
ponents and the service. It shows a user, Bob, invoking a resource a task request on the
AW-TRBAC portal. The portal using API generates xacml request for this to interact
with the AW-TRBAC engine and policy store to validate the request with information
from data stores, after evaluating the conditional obligation with the task instance and
a decision is made to grant or deny. The user can then have access to the authorised
resources.
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5.6 summary
This chapter details high level design and implementation of the AW-TRBAC, it il-
lustrates the API interfaces that are used to connect to dierent component of the
AW-TRBAC model, such as URI for invoking a security request and translation into an
XACML request, which then used by the extended AW-TRBAC policy engine to make
a decision on the request. Also in this chapter the mechanism behind extension of Oa-
sis standard explained specically to highlight involvement of each function in security
request such as Role change or dynamic SoD.
This is the third contribution of this thesis and rst of it's kind to be implemented, to
bridge the gaps within the dynamic access control, to the best of the author's knowledge
there has been no such implementation of policy engine to full these requirements of a
dynamic access control with the requirements such as dynamic segregation of duties at
task instance level to mitigate broken access control risk of OWASP OWASP (2017)top
10 risk of the application security.
In the next chapter AW-TRBAC functionality and scalability will be experimented and
evaluated with number of user simulated tests for functional validation and system per-




So far in Chapter Four AW-TRBAC model that have been proposed to include task
instance level restriction of a dynamic access control, this is an improvement from all
the previous access control model. In addition,to enforce the additional dynamic func-
tionality of the AW-TRBAC model, the Oasis standard (XACML) have been extended
with additional components. The AW-TRBAC engine have been implemented using
open source to include the custom functionality of the XACML in chapter Five. This
chapter presents the experimental setup of the research and describes tests that have
been carried out to determine the use case requirements satisfaction and applicability
of the dynamic access control model solution. Therefore, the identied requirements are
traced and validated through evaluation.
The evaluation is performed in two phases. The rst phase validates the access control
model requirements against the implemented AW-TRBAC system. The requirements
are pre-requisite for the proposed access control model, therefore it is essential to con-
rm that the dynamic access control model addresses these requirements. The second
phase demonstrates the applicability of the dynamic access control model in a simulated
industrial context, using the use case requirements to run an end-to-end process using
the AW-TRBAC engine of the dynamic access control model. The results were used to
determine whether it has aligned with the policy rules and the task constraints.
6.1 Requirements Satisfaction
The implemented AW-TRBAC model has been tested against the use case for the re-
quirements satisfaction and applicability of the solution. Six test cases have been tested
to determine whether the dynamic access control model meets the required constraints
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and characteristics. A script simulate a user making a security request using REST URI
which invoked the AW-TRBAC system, implemented as a microservice architecture,
that performs the dynamic access control. Access requests were converted to XACML
equivalent which was then validated through the XACML policy, implemented by the
AW-TRBAC engine. The engine in turn made various data assertions on the data store
before allowing access to the resource (access request system). A total of six scripts
were used to test the requirements identied in section 4.1.1 and the execution of the
constraints were recorded in a backend SQL database in Fig 6.6.
6.1.1 Test Case
The rst test case is the key policy requirements of dynamic segregation of Duties (SoD).
A test script in Fig 6.1 was used to simulate a human user invoking a REST API request
against the AW-TRBAC System. The request was validated against the policy, see
Fig 6.3, in the AW-TRBAC engine, using the policy conditional statements, and the
parameters from the input request, see Fig 6.4. If the conditions and attributes were
met then user was authorised to access the resource, as shown in Fig 6.5.
6.1.2 Invoking a SOD Security Request Through REST API
The below script is then executed by the AW-TRBAC engine, composes of a REST
request for the user "Bob" invokes a SoD request.
1 .....
2 String intitalRequestUrl =
"http://profdoc.uel.ac.uk/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/initial_request";↪→
3 RestTemplate restTemplate = new RestTemplate();







11 HttpEntity<UserRequest> request = new HttpEntity<>(initial_request);




Figure 6.1: Invoking a SOD Security Request Through REST API
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6.1.3 Policy for SoD Assertion in AW-TRBAC Engine
A SoD policy request is handled by the AW-TRBAC engine as shown below
1 PolicyEngineAW trbacEngine = new PolicyEngine()
2 File inputPolicyFile = new File('/response/xacml-security-response-policy.xml')
3 String policyRequestPath = "/request/xacml-security-response-req.xml"
4 Charset ascii = Charset.forName("US-ASCII")
5 byte[] encoded = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get(policyRequestPath))
6 String policyRequestStr = new String(encoded, ascii)
7 String output = policyEngine.executePolicy(policyRequestStr, file)
Figure 6.2: SoD policy request handled by the AW-TRBAC engine
6.1.4 SoD policy to Match
A SoD policy, see Fig 6.3 typically consists of one target and four conditional statements.
Lines 4-10 is the target statement, which matches the SoD request to the SoD policy.
Lines 16-30 show the rst two conditional statements. First it checks if the request is
coming from a valid user, if it does not match one of the dened values in the policy,
it would deny the request. If this is successful, it then checks to see if it is a valid task
request.
Lines 32-47 dene the third conditional statement, and uses an extended function role
check (see Fig 5.3) to check the role against the role store. If this is successful, the SoD
check is carried out.
Lines 49-65 consist of the fourth and the most important conditional statement. It
carries out the SoD check (see Fig 5.3) using the task instance ID in the data store, and
a successful check creates a new task instance which is updated in the data store.
6.1.5 XACML Request Generated for a Request Invoked Through API
XACML request
As mentioned earlier, the dynamic access control model has been developed on a microser-
vice infrastructure which converts the request invoked via REST API into an XACML
request. The parameters Task and user will be matched against the Balana engine
policy to validate task instance ID and the user, to provide a decision deny or permit
in Fig 6.4.
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1 <Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17"
2 <Description>Task based access control policy to check for segregation of duties </Description>...











14 <Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule-1"> <Condition> <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">































46 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
47 </Apply>
48 </Apply> ....





















Figure 6.3: Policy for SoD assertion in AW-TRBAC Engine
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1 <Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" Combined
Decision="false" ReturnPolicyIdList="false">↪→
































Figure 6.4: XACML Request Generated for a Request Invoked Through API
6.1.6 Response for the Invoked Request Through REST API
As shown below 6.5, the response has been provided for the invoked EST API request
(test case one). If all of the conditions are met then the decision is to permit, otherwise
the decision is to deny.
Response to the Request









Figure 6.5: Response for the Invoked Request Through REST API
6.1.7 Binding of Duties (BoD)
BoD dependencies are when security request to be closed o by the same user who submit
the request, this is enforced using the policy and the custom function dened in the policy
engine, full list of policies have been appended at the appendix A. As shown below the
policy which has been used by the AW-TRBAC engine to carry out BoD constraints
against the data store Role Assigned Store task instance, in this instance is Bob, who
is the role Security coordinator can close the request, the policy will use the parameters
Role, Task Instance ID to evaluate the request to provide decision to user, see Appendix
A.
6.2 Requirement Validation
For validation purposes, the implemented solution has been run and associated outputs
were recorded in Fig 6.6. For Example, UserId Mat has role permission manager
which allows him to approve the security request submitted by UserID Bob who has
the role coordinator, as shown in row one of the Fig 6.6. This satises the requirement
that only authorised users access the resources and second row in the Fig 6.6, showing
SoD constraints followed through role and task instance through restriction on task
instance ID Tif917803b row one of the table. The Manager Role acted on the task that
is on row one, this is to ensure segregation of duties are performed at task instance level
as well as role level, which satises the requirement of dynamic segregation of duties at
the instance level.
In the action column in row two of the Fig 6.6, the status is changed to approved,
this records the role that performed and the action on a task (security request) and
resources (PC) that have been authorised by the role manager (Mat) on a task instance
(Tif917803b) at a point in time. This satises the requirement of adequate event logging
and access availability in real time ensuring governance.
Dynamic segregation of duties at instance level is also shown in row four, tf317701a is
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an instanceId for a role change request, submitted by the role Coordinator, which is
shown in the task column as Role Change. This is approved by the role manager, a
new task instance is recorded change-rolecurrent-approve, and action status is set to
approve. This proves that SoD is enforced at the levels of task instance Id, subject and
role. Also shown in row six is the subject Duncan who is the second level of approver
for the onboarding service, and who approves the same task instance Id.
The task instance reference tf317701a as shown in Fig 6.6, ensures task contingency
and sequence ow of tasks approval maintained and role change data store is updated.
This will enable existing role will no longer remain active for the subject. This rule of
enforcement in the policy allows revocation of existing entitlements and provision of new
credentials.
Results in Fig 6.6, demonstrate that the policy engine successfully enforced the task con-
straints for SoD, BoD and Role Change, Instance Level Restriction, Event Logging, en-
suring governance and mitigating broken access control risk through remediation of esca-
lation of privilege vulnerability through instance level restriction and validation through
the function in the policy engine, meeting dynamic access control requirements.
Figure 6.6: Audit Logs of the Tests Based on Requirement Satisfaction Experiment
6.3 Applicability of the AW-TRBAC
To measure the system performance for the use case, and to check whether AW-TRBAC
is a sustainable in the real-life solution, this research experiment benchmarked against
similar work carried out by Ali and Moreau (2013) whereby the author extended the
Balana engine to translate the provenance-based policy language into an XACML request
for provenance based data. To the author's knowledge there have been no other attempts
to extend the Oasis standard for dynamic access control requirements, thereby there is
no other existing data available for comparison. The system was setup to measure
performance of the policy enforcement by recording the cumulative time for end-to-end
execution of a policy; this includes policy request, translation and execution in a policy
engine. A total of one million executions were recorded. Requests were executed in a
sequence of ten thousand batches and each result (containing mean value with error bar
at 95% condence level) was recorded against the two hypotheses:
1. System performance will not degrade with the dynamic access control request.
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2. Increased conditional statement with a role change will aect the processing time.
6.3.1 Hypothesis
Hypothesis One: System performance will not degrade with the dynamic access control
request.
Benchmark Environment: The experiments used to evaluate the performance of the
framework were based on Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-2820QM CPU @2.30 GHZ, with 6Gb
of RAM and 600Gb of disk space.
Methods: The requirement one from (section 4.1.1) of the use case in relation to SoD
has been tested for policy evaluation, generated using REST API client. The REST client
would make a query to the AW-TRBAC engine, which executed the XACML policy and
response back to the REST client as shown in Fig 6.7. The engine uses data from the
data store from previous methods to evaluate the policy. The experimental setup ran 1
million end-to-end runs in a batch of 10,000 security request executions in Fig 6.8, then
calculated the mean which is depicted in Fig 6.10.
Figure 6.7: Security Request Executed via API Client Call to AW-TRBAC Engine
Figure 6.8: Security Request Result for the API client to AW-TRBAC Engine Performance
Test
Results: As shown in Fig 6.10, there is a relatively high execution time at the beginning,
this is due to a number of factors such as: class loader initialising of classes, loading
OS level resources, fragmented hard disk. There has a sudden spike in execution in
the middle of the experiment, this is believed to be due to the running of the JVM
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(Java Virtual Machine) garbage collector, which is a program that manages memory
automatically wherein de-allocation of objects is handled by Java. When there are no
references to an objects, it is assumed to be no longer needed and the memory occupied
by the objects is reclaimed and deleted resulting in execution jitter (delay). However,
results were consistent throughout the experiment for execution of end to end process of
SoD request, it took an average of 0.12 (S) for the end-to-end request to complete, with
a standard error of 0.02(S) with the condence interval set at 95%. This indicates that
despite the additional overheads of AW-TRBAC engine, benchmarked against (Ali and
Moreau (2013)) which took 0.42 (S) for end-to-end request of similar experiment. The
system performance is commercially viable.
Hypothesis two: Increased conditional statement with a role change will aect the
processing time.
Benchmark Environment: The experiments used to evaluate the performance of the
framework were based on Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-2820QM CPU @2.30 GHZ, with 6Gb
of RAM and 600Gb of disk space.
Methods: Using REST API client, role change requests were made to the XACML
server, which executed the XACML policy by the AW-TRBAC engine. The experimental
setup ran 1 million ends to end runs of a security request execution, as shown in Fig 6.9,
then calculating the variance for simple security request against the complex role change
request the variance this is presented in Fig 6.10.
Figure 6.9: Comparison of System Performance Against Complex Role Change Request
Results: As shown in Fig 6.9, there has been a spike of executions at the beginning
and in the middle of the experiment on execution of the policies. This is due to several
factors; at the beginning class loader initialisation of the classes, loading os level re-
sources, fragmented hard drive, which contributed to the spike with few initial policies,
however it has been consistent thereafter. There has been a sudden spike in execution
in the middle of the experiment, this is believed to be due to the running of the JVM
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garbage collector, which is a program that manages memory automatically wherein de-
allocation of objects is handled by Java, when there are no references to an objects, it is
assumed to be no longer needed and the memory occupied by the objects is reclaimed
and deleted, this is an automated standard component of Java programming language.
However, there has been recent research in Simao et al. (2019) memory management for
real-time Java VM (virtual Machine), a Self-adaptive approach for memory-performance
eciency through a learning phase and an execution phase (a training phase where it
collects, with dierent heap (data Structure) resizing policies, representative execution
metrics during the lifespan of a workload; and an execution phase where the execution
parameters of new workloads against those of already seen workloads, and enforces the
best heap resizing policy)to improve the realtime task execution jitter. It has been noted
that complex role change request have additional conditional statements which require
evaluation of variable parameters coupled with retrieval of information from the data
store, which delays the decision output. In comparison to SoD requests, which require
few statements analyses by the engine and have a mean request time of 0.12(S), Role
Change requests in this experiment had a mean request time of 0.26 (S) in Fig 6.10.
The time taken to process the Role Change request with complex conditions is almost
double. However, the performance remained consistent during the performance test. As
show in Fig 6.10 the standard deviation of 0.039(S) from the mean for Role Change
requests remained fairly constant with a 0.039(S) s margin of error and a 95% condence
interval of 0.076, which indicates that if the system performance was retested again at
95% condence interval it will have 0.95 probability of containing the mean 0.26(S), and
95% of the access request distribution is contained in the condence interval. Although
complexity within the statement has increased the required processing power, this will
be scalable in industry with enhanced processing power. In this thesis relational data
store is used, which means performance is better that XML data store used by Ali (Ali
and Moreau (2013)).
Figure 6.10: Summary of Results for SoD and Role Change Request
 N - number of items (request unit)
 SD - Standard deviation (s)
 SE - Standard error (s)
 CI - Condence interval (set to 95%)
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6.4 Summary
This chapter presents the experimental setup and results for the AW-TRBAC system
evaluation against the functional requirements of the use case. The rst phase of the
experiment has been setup using six test cases that simulate a user invoking a secu-
rity request against the AW-TRBAC engine to satisfy the requirements constraints and
policy enforcement of the dynamic access control model. AW-TRBAC have been suc-
cessfully able to meet the requirements of dynamic SoD through restriction of instance
level SoD, dynamic role change through role change at the policy level, preventing the
risk of escalation of privilege, inhibiting the access to previous role and credentials, ade-
quate logging through sequence of events, providing governance of access management.
The second phase of the experiment was carried out to learn about system performance
under a stress test; this has been carried out by measuring the security request end to
end response time from client to server, to learn about the solution performance when
a complex security request is invoked. There were total of one million requests tested
in batches of 10,000 and the mean time of each batch was recorded to calculate the
nal mean time taken for each type of request to be processed by the system. To the
author's knowledge no such policy engine have been developed to meet the requirements
of AW-TRBAC model, thereby no experimental data is available, however experiments
that has been benchmarked against similar experiment carried out by (Ali and Moreau
(2013)) and the results indicate that it is commercially viable.
In the next chapter, thesis is concluded with summary of the ndings and its limitations
and opportunities for future research.
Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis focused primarily on resolving a real-world problem, using academic research
for the specic industry problem and contribute a solution which is viable within the
borderless security in the new technology era. The research was carried out to resolve an
industrial problem and provide sustainability for the dynamic emerging technology in a
borderless environment through development/adoption of a dynamic access control model
leveraging on XACML policy enforcement to improve the overall risk posture of the rm.
The research developed a dynamic access control model leveraging on existing RBAC
and ABAC access control models to provide the capability of task instance segregation
coupled with role level segregation. Instance level restrictions were imposed upon tasks
that are permissioned through role enablement for a user.
Other aspect which this research focuses on is the IT workow, ensuring an audit trail
of processes from owner approvals, through the sequence of tasks being followed and
enforced, to role, task, process and task instances. The research extended the OASIS
standard, introducing ve new functions and two repositories to enhance the function-
ality through further development of the AW-TRBAC engine using open source Balana
engine. This extension helps to ll a gap within current access control models to en-
able real-time decision making in a dynamic borderless environment, such as adoption of
cloud and Robotic process automation. The research also focused on mitigating the crit-
ical web application risk highlighted by the OWASP standard, preventing broken access
control through policy/rule enforcement and a dynamic access control model incorporat-
ing dynamic SoD and governance. The research also provides a solution to mitigate the
risks associated with insucient logging and monitoring through policy enforcement on
data store, through creation of task instance level with events and actions. This will be
an enabler for cutting edge IT deployment through enhancement of risk posture. The
AW-TRBAC model framework was able to meet the requirements for borderless network
perimeter access control that requires dynamic and real time decision making for provid-
ing resource access to authorized users. It was noted that simple security requests took,
on average, 0.12 s to process, while the complex request such as a change in service role
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with additional conditional statements and targets doubled this time to 0.26 s; this, in
comparison to the benchmark experiment by (Ali and Moreau (2013)), is commercially
viable.
7.1 Contributions of this Thesis
Key Contributions of this thesis are:
7.1.1 First Contribution
The development of a dynamic access control model. This was developed using the use
case requirements of an investment bank and based on lling gaps identied in the lit-
erature review. In Banking industries, due to high risk applications that supports its
investment decisions on operational. It is crucial that access to resources is permitted
only to authorised users and is permitted in a timely manner when access is required.
Access governance ensures access to resources is authorised appropriately and account-
ably, and traceability is retained. In the use case, access control and access governance
systems were operating in silos and it was necessary to have one streamlined process and
a system to support that process. This system needed to be dynamic, with intelligence
to make a real time decision based on policy rules which support both roles based and
task based instance restrictions, meet BoD and SoD requirements, and provide access
governance and logs (audit logs for compliance requirements in forensic analytic). The
access control model needed to meet the challenge of role changes, ensuring entitlements
were revoked from the previous level prior to granting new access, and ensure access has
been authorised and governed appropriately to promote governance and risk mitigation.
7.1.2 Second Contribution
An extended XACML based open source balana engine that facilitates and enforces the
dynamic access control rules and additional requirements to full the gaps in currently
available access control models: to enforce SoD at the task instance, remediate broken
access control risk, and log instance task events to enhances access governance to provide
visibility of unmanaged data.
To full the policy enforcement, a policy language was required which supports the Role,
Task and Operation notation. XACML was chosen as the policy language which would
work well with dynamic access control due to its cohesion and coupling ability. The
XACML Oasis standard has previously been extended to support RBAC, however it
was lacking task notation capability. To meet the task requirements and the dynamic
capability of the AW-TRBAC model, and enable data assertion within the data store,
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which could be utilized during decision making and retaining audit trails for forensic
analytic (Compliance), XACML standard has been extended with customised function
for policy enforcement.
7.1.3 Third Contribution
An Implementation of the AW-TRBAC engine, leverages on banking solution, to ensure
for greater control of existing information security management and information privacy.
The AW-TRBAC has been built on the open source Balana policy engine by developing
functions to support additional functionality; it was extended to support an additional
ve functions for real-time decision making capability.
The evaluation was carried out, using the use case requirements, by simulating six test
cases to meet constraints and characteristics dened in the dynamic access control model.
A script simulated a user making a security request using the REST URI, which invoked
the TR-BAC system, implemented as microservice architecture that performs the dy-
namic access control. The result showed that the AW TRBAC model successfully met
the requirement constraints of the case study and mitigated the risk of escalation of
privilege to prevent data disclosure to unauthorised user.
1. Requirement 1: Access request shall only be submitted by the role Security Coor-
dinator.
2. Requirement 2: Authorised Business Process Owner should approve the Security
request.
3. Requirement 3: Only Authorised users shall be permitted access to resources.
4. Requirement 4: User Access to be revoked after termination of service and service
change.
5. Requirement 5: Service transfer through role change requires two level of Process
Owner approvals. (departing Service and Onboarding) and revocation of existing
and provisioning on new credentials.
6. Requirement 6: Sucient logging of events to be retained and monitored.
The AW-TRBAC model has been tested for applicability against the use case by mea-
suring system performance under stress test of executing 1 million security requests of
a complex nature. AW-TRBAC has minimal impact on overall system performance de-
spite changing user access requests dynamically and mitigating the risk of escalation of
privilege to prevent data disclosure.
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7.2 Future Research
This thesis has achieved the goals and objectives set for the research, however, there are
areas which could be explored further in future research, such as:
Development of Tool: Although AW-TRBAC model has undergone performance test,
due to time constraints and capacity, it was not possible to test the dynamic access
model to its full potential in real life. It is, however, dicult to predict performance
on an industrial scale. Further research could be to develop AW-TRBAC model at
full industrial scale to further understand its limitations and benets. There are many
complex policies within the industries with complex rules which may need to be explored
further to test for usability.
Adaptation within the Federated Environment: AW-TRBAC model has been
developed and designed to be adopted in a dynamic environment; this could be applied
in a federated environment such as a cloud, as it has the capability to evaluate requests in
real-time decision making. It could well suit an environment that requires accountabilities
and compliance, such as professional services or aviation industries due to its dynamic
nature and analysis capability.
CASB (Cloud Access Security Broker) Environment: AW-TRBAC model could
be extended to support a broker in a borderless security setup. This would be a service
that sits between an organization's on-premises infrastructure and a cloud provider's
infrastructure. Acting as a gatekeeper, it would allow the organization to extend the
reach of their security policies beyond their own infrastructure.
Authorisation Engine: AW-TRBAC model is eectively an authorisation model which
could be integrated with SSO technology such as SAML to provide an identity access




Test Case: A Coordinator can only submit a security request
Test Script
1 public void xacml_task_security_request_test() throws IOException {
2 ...
3 PolicyEngine policyEngine = new PolicyEngine();
4 File file = new File("target/classes/policies/xacml-security-request-policy.xml");
5 ....
6 //XACML Policy to use
7 String policyRequestPath = "target/classes/policies/xacml-security-request-req.xml";
8
9 Charset ascii = Charset.forName("US-ASCII");
10 byte[] encoded = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get(policyRequestPath));
11 String policyRequestStr = new String(encoded, ascii);
12 String output = policyEngine.executePolicy(policyRequestStr, file);
13 }
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18 <Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule-1">
19 <Condition>
20 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">































51 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
52 </Apply>
53



















73 <Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="Deny-Rule" />
74 </Policy>
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Test Case for SoD
1 \textbf{Test Script}
2
3 public void xacml_task_security_approve_test() throws IOException {
4
5 ...
6 PolicyEngine policyEngine = new PolicyEngine();
7
8 File file = new File("target/classes/policies/xacml-security-response-policy.xml");
9 String policyRequestPath = "target/classes/policies/xacml-security-response-req.xml";
10 Charset ascii = Charset.forName("US-ASCII");
11 byte[] encoded = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get(policyRequestPath));
12 String policyRequestStr = new String(encoded, ascii);
13 String output = policyEngine.executePolicy(policyRequestStr, file);
14 Assert.assertTrue(output.contains("Permit"));
15 }
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11 <Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule-1">
12 <Condition>
13 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">





















35 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
36 </Apply>
37


































72 <Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="Deny-Rule" />
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Test Case for BoD
Test Script
1 public void xacml_BOD_task_security_response_close_test() throws IOException {
2
3 ...
4 PolicyEngine policyEngine = new PolicyEngine();
5 File file = new
File("target/classes/policies/xacml-security-response-close-policy.xml");↪→
6 String policyRequestPath =
"target/classes/policies/xacml-security-response-close-req.xml";↪→
7
8 Charset ascii = Charset.forName("US-ASCII");
9 byte[] encoded = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get(policyRequestPath));
10 String policyRequestStr = new String(encoded, ascii);
11 String output = policyEngine.executePolicy(policyRequestStr, file);
12 ...
13 }
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9 <Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule-1">
10 <Condition>
11 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">








20 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
21 </Apply>
22




































59 <Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="Deny-Rule" />
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Test Case for Role Change: Department Transfer 1st Approval Test Script
1 public void xacml_SOD_task_change_role_request_approve_one_test() throws IOException {
2 ..
3 PolicyEngine policyEngine = new PolicyEngine();
4 File file = new
File("target/classes/policies/xacml-change-role-current-approve-policy.xml");↪→
5 String policyRequestPath =
"target/classes/policies/xacml-change-role-current-approve-req.xml";↪→
6 Charset ascii = Charset.forName("US-ASCII");
7 byte[] encoded = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get(policyRequestPath));
8 String policyRequestStr = new String(encoded, ascii);
9 String output = policyEngine.executePolicy(policyRequestStr, file);
10 Assert.assertTrue(output.contains("Permit"));
11 }
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9 <Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule-1">
10 <Condition>
11 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">



















31 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
32 </Apply>
33
34 <!-- Check for valid existing role -->
35





























65 <Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="Deny-Rule" />
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Onboarding Manager (2nd) Approval for Role Change:
Test Script
1 public void xacml_SOD_task_change_role_request_approve_two_test() throws IOExcep-tion {
2
3 ...
4 PolicyEngine policyEngine = new PolicyEngine();
5
6 File file = new
File("target/classes/policies/xacml-change-role-new-approve-policy.xml");↪→
7 String policyRequestPath =
"target/classes/policies/xacml-change-role-new-approve-req.xml";↪→
8
9 Charset ascii = Charset.forName("US-ASCII");
10 byte[] encoded = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get(policyRequestPath));
11 String policyRequestStr = new String(encoded, ascii);
12 String output = policyEngine.executePolicy(policyRequestStr, file);
13 Assert.assertTrue(output.contains("Permit"));
14 }
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9 <Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="Rule-1">
10 <Condition>
11 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:and">























35 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" />
36 </Apply>
37
38 <!-- Check for valid existing role -->
39





























69 <Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="Deny-Rule" />
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A.1 Case Study
This is a brief outline of the case study and the workshop conducted with the key
stakeholder from an Investment Bank in London.
A.1.1 Introduction and Justication
Information is the key driver for business strategy development, to deliver world class
and innovation client service and to remain relevant and competitive. It is imperative
to govern and manage access to the information with adequate information security
and access governance. Information access governance present challenges, due to sheer
volume of complex systems, processes with diverse policies.
Investment Bank are highly regulated environment with critical (High Risk) application
that require robust information security controls to protect from malicious threat and
to maintain its, availability, integrity and condentiality. This require security controls
to be embedded into the system development to include both technical and procedural
controls. Control such as Segregation of Duties (SoD) are as an example which is to
prevent fraud, needs to be included into system level and at the process level to ensure
a single individual or business process cannot submit and approve a request.
A.1.2 Aim
The aim of this case study is to collect relevant information in a workshop with key
stakeholder in a real-life investment organisation to understand how Access governance
are executed. This will provide insight into how access governance is carried out in
multiple business processes that run across multiple systems that deal with dierent
authorisation management policies.
A.1.3 Methodology
Having worked in the Information assurance department for the organisation, it was
observed there were processes which were inconsistent, lack of visibility of attestation
reports, access request process was complex and multiple silos access system and policy
applied for management of access control. As banking organisations are regulated and
require robust security policies to protect its asset such as information.
There were no of workshops which has been used to connect the dots of various access
governance process, including new joiner, leaver, role transfer and emergency mainte-
nance process requiring privileged account management. Questions were framed to allow
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adequate information can be collected without deep diving into the process to stay rele-
vant.
A.1.4 Choosing the process
Based on the complexity of the environment, run across multiple systems, includes sen-
sitive access control requirements,information ows across number of business processes.
Access governance has been grouped into three process: access request, access authori-
sation and access Administration.
A.1.5 Key Stakeholder
As the three chosen processes are operational and deal with the assets, systems and
process of the organisation, and because information security through access governance
is the focus, thereby the following three key stakeholder were invited to the workshop;
1. Information Security Dept Head
2. Security Administrator
3. Information Owner (Business side Director/approver)
A.1.6 Workshop
Workshop was held with the key stakeholder in the oce to understand the current
process of Access Management Lifecycle to include the tool, people and process involved
in the governance of access request approval.
Access Request Process
1. Who are the people involved in the process?
2. What are the roles of the people involved?
3. What is the role hierarchy of these roles (chain of command)?
4. What are the systems involved in this process and who is responsible for these
systems?
5. What kind of information security concerns do you have in relation to this process?
6. Are there any access control restrictions related to systems involved in this process?
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Access Authorisation Process
1. What are the steps for access authorisation of a request?
2. What are the dierent types of request?
3. Who are the people involved in the process?
4. What are the roles of the people involved?
5. What is the role hierarchy of these roles (chain of command)?
6. What are the systems involved in this process and who is responsible for these
systems?
7. What kind of information security concerns do you have in relation? to this process?
8. Are there any access control restrictions related to systems involved in this process?
Access Administration Process
1. What are the steps involved in Security administration?
2. Who are the people involved in the process?
3. Are there task constraints involved in actioning any of the process?
4. What are the challenges around security administration of a request?
5. What are the systems involved in this process and who is responsible for these
systems?
There were number of follow up workshop conducted and the below workow of access
governance process were presented to ensure requirements were captured accurately.
Workow of New User Request
Workow of Role Transfer
Workow of Termination
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Figure A.1: Sequence diagram showing new user request workow
Figure A.2: Sequence diagram showing role transfer request workow
Figure A.3: Sequence diagram showing role termination request workow
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